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I. STATEMENT OF THE C^SE 
A. Nature of the Case and Proceedings Below 
The underlying case is a sheriffs sale/redemption dispute. Appellants J. Bond and 
Dorius are former attorneys for Appellee David Pyper (;TyJ3ef') and obtained a judgment 
against Pyper for unpaid legal fees. J. Bond and Dorius (hereinafter, ''the Attorneys*') 
instituted a sheriffs sale of Pyper's real property. Upon completion of the sale, they 
transferred some of their interest in the real property to Appellant A. Bond (also an 
attorney). Pyper disputed the sale based on, among other things, gross inadequacy of the 
purchase price and irregularities by the Attorneys during th^ six-month redemption 
period. 
This case was tried at a day-long hearing before Sixth District Court Judge David 
Mower on June 23, 2008. In his September 2. 2008 Memorandum Decision (Including 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law) Judge Mower se(t aside the sheriffs sale. He 
signed and entered the final order in this case on October l|5, 2008. The Attorneys 
appealed to the Utah Court of Appeals, which affirmed the Trial Court's decision in 
Pyper v. Bond, 2009 UT App 331. The Attorneys now appfeal the Pyper decision. 
B. Pyper's Response to the Attorneys' Statement offyte Facts 
The Attorneys inappropriately attempt to set forth a [number of factual allegations 
in the Statement of Facts and Argument sections of their Btief of Appellants Their 
factual allegations are irrelevant and inapplicable because The Attorneys asserted no 
challenge before the Pyper court of the Trial Court's findings of fact (and, indeed, they 
1 
failed to marshal any evidence before the Pyper court that supported the Trial Court's 
findings of fact and conclusions of law). Accordingly, the Trial Court's findings of fact 
(set forth immediately below) govern over any facts asserted by the Attorneys. 
C. Pyper's Statement of Material Facts 
Because the Trial Court's findings of fact govern this appeal, Pyper restates the 
Trial Court's salient findings of fact from the Memorandum Decision: 
1. Pyper incurred attorney's fees to J. Bond in the amount of $9,064.82, 
which Pyper failed to pay. (R. at 406, UK 3-4) 
2. J. Bond filed an action to collect his attorney's fees, resulting in a March 
1, 2006 judgment of $10,577.23 against Pyper. (R. at 407, H1J5-6) 
3. J. Bond then obtained a Writ of Execution to collect on the judgment, 
and levied against real property owned by Pyper. (R. at 407, Iff7-8) 
4. Pyper's real property is a 1,500 - 1,600 square foot house on a one-half 
acre lot valued in the range of $125,000 to $127,764. (R. at 407,119) 
5. A sheriffs sale occurred on November 9, 2006 whereat J. Bond was the 
only bidder. (R. at 407,11^10-12) 
6. J. Bond successfully bid $329, which was the only bid on the property. 
(R. at 407-408, HH13-16) 
7. J. Bond did not pay any cash for the property because the sale price of 
$329 was less than the $10,577.23 judgment. (R. at 408,1117) 
8. At the time there were several liens on the property, which Pyper w^ as 
able to clear off in April 2007. (R. at 408, |H 19) 
9. Even assuming there was still a $50,000 miortgage on the property, based 
on the $125,000 - $127,764 value of the property, there was $75,000 -
$77,764 equity in the property, which J. Bpnd bought for $329. (R. at 
413) 
10. Pyper desired to redeem the property fromlthe Sheriffs sale. (R. at 408, 
1120) 
11. On April 20, 2007, Pyper called the Attorneys' law firm (Dorius, Bond, 
Reyes & Linares) asking for a judgment lijsn payoff (R. at 408,1121) 
12. Pyper was unable to speak with either of title Attorneys, but was told by 
their staff that the firm would call him bac^ k. (R. at 408,1122) 
13. No one called Pyper back. However, on April 25, 2007 Pyper made 
another phone call to the law firm and spo|ke with Dorius about a payoff 
amount. (R. at 408, H23) 
14. Although Dorius and Pyper have conflicting accounts of the April 25, 
2007 conversation, Dorius told Pyper he Reeded to first talk to J. Bond 
about it. (R. at 408-409, H1J24-25) 
15. Thereafter, Pyper called Dorius's office e^ery day, making a total of 
approximately 28 phone calls. (R. at 409 1126) 
16. Pyper explained that he called the law firrh these many times in order to 
obtain a payoff amount because he did no^ : know the exact amount, and 
3 
thought that some interest might have been added to the original amount. 
(R. at 411,1144) 
17. On May 16, 2007, a Sheriffs Deed w as issued transferring the property 
to Bond. (R. at 409,1127) 
18. On May 17, 2007, Pyper called J. Bond and told him that Pyper had 
money to pay off the judgment. (R. at 409,1^28-29) 
19. J. Bond told Pyper that the Attorneys needed to get together and figure 
out the amount of the payoff, and that he would call Pyper back. (R. at 
410, U130-32) 
20. J. Bond never called Pyper back. (R. at 410, H33) 
21. Pyper kept calling the Attorneys almost every day until May 30, 2007. 
(R. at 410, H36) 
22. On May 30, 2007, Pyper called his attorney, Bryan Quesenberry, for 
help in obtaining the payoff amount. (R. at 410,113 7) 
23. That same day Quesenberry called Dorius to ask for a payoff amount. 
(R. at 410,1138) 
24. Dorius told Quesenberry that Dorius would call him back by end of the 
week, but never called Quesenberry back. (R. at 411, H1J39-40) 
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II. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Attorneys5 first argument seeking reversal of th4 Court of Appeals decision in 
Pyperv, Bond, 2009 UT App 331 is that the Pyper court incorrectly applied Utah caselaw 
when it interpreted the two-part test established in Young v[ Schroeder, 37 P. 252 (1894)1 
and reaffirmed in Pender v. Dowse, 265 P.2d 644 (Utah 19$4). This argument, however, 
misreads the Young decision, ignores the United States Supreme Court's affirmation of 
Young, and also misreads the Pyper court's review and application of Young, 
The Attorneys' second argument on appeal is that P|yper supposedly creates 
unwise precedent. This argument, however, is premised on| a convenient and selective 
ignorance of facts found by the Trial Court in favor of Pyp^r. Viewing Pyper in light of 
the compelling facts which the Trial Court and the Pyper court found shocking, both 
courts properly invoked their equitable discretion to extend] the redemption period in 
favor of Pyper. 
1
 A copy of Young is attached hereto as Appendix exhibit ijiumber 1. 
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III. ARGUMENT 
The correct standard of review is abuse of discretion according to Huston v. 
Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991). Huston is one of the three key cases related to this 
appeal, and is discussed below. In Huston, the court held that expanding the redemption 
period is discretionary: 
We have stated that in appropriate circumstances, a court may enlarge a 
redemption period under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 6(2). Rule 6(2) provides. 
'When by these rules . . . an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a 
specific time, the court for cause shown may at any time in its discretion . . . order 
the period enlarged . . . .v Since rule 6(2) clearly grants the court discretion, we 
review the court's decision for an abuse of that discretion, [footnote omitted]. 
Generally, we will not find an abuse of discretion unless, given the applicable law 
and facts, the Mai court's decision is unreasonable, [footnote omitted] 
Id. at 534 (emphasis added). See also, State in Interest of H., 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 
1980) (citation omitted) (holding, uIn equity proceedings we are charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the evidence; and it is the established rule that we will not 
disturb the findings and determination made unless they are clearly against the weight of 
the evidence, or the court has abused its discretion^). 
Summarizing this burden of proof on appeal, the Huston court explained that in 
order for the Attorneys "to succeed, they must show that the equities of the[] case are not 
so compelling that the trial judge acted unreasonably in . . . extending the period/' 
Huston, 818 P.2d at 536. 
A. THE PYPER COURT PROPERLY APPLIED YOUNG, PENDER AND 
OTHER RELEVANT CASELAW 
Abandoning in their Brief of Appellants the certiorari argument that the Pvper 
6 
court erred in interpreted Young's two-part test in setting astide a sheriffs sale, the 
Attorneys focus their efforts on distinguishing Young and Render from the present 
dispute by arguing that the Pyper court failed to properly aflply these cases. 
As set forth in Pyper, the test to be applied in the prdsent case to equitably extend 
the redemption period is (1) whether there was such a gros^ inadequacy of price in the 
Attorneys' purchase of the Pyper Property that would shocljc the conscience, and (2) 
whether there were irregularities attending the sale (or redemption period). Pyper, 2009 
UT App 331, «[  1 1 (citing Young, 37 P. at 254). Notably, th|e Attorneys did not attack the 
first part of this two-part test in their appeal to the Pyper cdurt. (See, Brief of Appellants, 
Utah Court of Appeals, pgs. 10-17). Now, before the present Court, the Attorneys do not 
attack the Pyper court's recitation of this two-part test deriyed from Young. Instead, they 
Attorneys complain that the Pyper court misapplied certain] conclusions or principals that 
the Pyper court derived from Young. 
1. The Trial Court and Pyper Court Property Concluded that the Facts of 
This Case Satisfy the First Part of the Young Test 
To the extent the Attorneys argue the first part of th£ Young test (i.e. by claiming 
that there was no gross inadequacy of price), they are barred because of their failure to 
assert this argument in their underlying appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. (See, Brief 
of Appellants at 10-17). Nor do the Attorneys actually address this first prong of the 
Young test in their Brief of Appellants in the present appeapL The Attorneys have thus 
implicitly conceded the first part of Young's two-part test. However, in case the 
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Attorneys attempt to resurrect this argument in their reply appeal brief, Pyper addresses it 
as follows. 
Regarding the first part of the Young test (i.e. gross inadequacy of price), both the 
Trial Court and the Pyper court were appalled at the sacrifice of Pyper's property (which 
was conservatively valued at containing $75,000 in equity). Both courts found that when 
comparing the $75,000 windfall the Attorneys received for the paltry sheriffs sale price 
of $329, such clearly shocked the conscience of an impartial mind and was a grossly 
inequitable sacrifice of Pyper's property (and after the sheriffs sale the Attorneys still 
had their $10,577.23 judgment against Pyper!)J. The Attorneys' $329 sheriffs sale 
purchase price was 0.44% of the $75,000 value of Pyper's property. By comparison, the 
creditor in Young obtained a $1,673.36 default judgment against the debtor, and then 
executed on the debtor's real property, which was valued at $25,000. Young, 37 P. at 
252. The Young sheriff sale purchase price translates into 6.7% of the value of the 
debtor's property. In reviewing these facts, the Young court held: 
wherever the court perceives that a sale of property has been made at a grossly 
inadequate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a 
strong, and, in general, a conclusive, presumption, though there be no direct proof 
of fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the ignorance, -weakness, or 
the disfress or necessity of the vendor, and this imposes on the purchaser a 
2
 This $75,000 value would have been the value at the time of the sheriffs sale, but six 
months later when the sheriffs deed was issued, the value of Pyper's property was 
$125,000 because Pyper had removed, among other things, a $50,000 bank lien. 
3
 It is critical to note that the Trial Court never dissolved the Attorneys' judgment or their 
judgment lien on Pyper's property. The Attorneys still maintain their judgment and their 
ability to re-schedule a new sheriffs sale if the Pyper decision is affirmed. 
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necessity to remove this violent presumption by the plearest evidence of fairness 
of his conduct. 
Id. at 254 (emphasis added). Whether viewing the 0.44% pjurchase-to-value in the 
present case b\ MsclL or whdhct" ucwing if juxtaposed to the 6.7% purchase-io-valnr of 
Young, the Attorneys in the present case clearly obtained Pyper" s property for a song. It 
is thus no wonder the Trial Court and the Pyper court foun4 the sheriff sale purchase 
price in the present case constituted a gross inadequacy of jj)rice that shocked the 
conscience of a reasonable person, wh ich is the first par 1: of the Young test. 
The Pyper court even noted, correctly, that this conclusion (regarding the first 
prong of the Young test) could alone form the basis (without further considering the 
second prong of the Y oung test) for equitably extending the redemption period P\ per, 
2009 I JT App 331, fl.2 n 5 (citing Young. 37 P. at 254 ("If the inadequacy is so gross as 
at once to shock the conscience of all fair and impartial mhads, if the sacrifice is such that 
even7 honest man would hesitate to take advantage of it it may well be doubted whether 
every such case would be beyond the power of a c • :>i: n t of eqi lity to relieve a gainst")). 
2. The Trial Court and Pyper Court Properly Concluded that the Facts of 
This Case Satisfy the Second Part of the Yjpung Test 
In the context of the second part of the Young test (Regularities attending the 
sale, or slight ci rci lmstances when the pi irehaser is an attorney)5 the A ttorneys spend 
considerable time in their Brief of Appellants arguing that the Pyper court misapplied the 
facts of Young. The Attorneys are in error. The Pyper coiirt correctly affirmed the Trial 
Court's conclusion ilia t the.,./ \ ttorne> s? c -onduct diiri ng the six-mc >nth redemption period. 
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and the fact that the Attorneys are lawyers, amounted to slight circumstances attending 
the sale, and thus allowed Pyper to satisfy the second part of Young's two-part test. 
-(a)v In Both Young and Pyper, Lawyers that Participated in the 
Sheriffs Sales Were the Same Lawyers that Purchased the 
Debtors5 Property Sold at the Sheriffs Sales 
In Young the creditor's lawyers, who attached and levied on the debtor's property, 
were the same lawyers who purchased the debtor's property at the sheriffs sale. Young, 
27 P. at 255. The same occurred in the sheriffs sale at issue in the present appeal. The 
Attorneys scheduled the sheriffs sale, caused it to be published, and one of them 
attended and, being the only bidder, successfully credit-bid a fraction ($329) of the total 
$10,577.23 judgment against Pyper to obtain Pyper's property at the sheriffs sale. (See, 
Pyper's Statement o Material Facts, supra, ^ 3 , 5-6). 
The Young court explained that because the creditors' attorneys participated in 
and purchased the debtor's property from the sheriffs sale, their conduct required special 
scrutiny. Id. at 254 ("an additional feature of the transaction is that Stephens & 
Schroeder were members of the bar, attorneys for the judgment creditors, who thus, under 
the forms of law and the processes of the court, sought to enrich themselves without any 
consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor . . ."). The Young court viewed the 
creditors' participation in the purchase of the debtor's property at the sheriffs sale with 
stern disapproval: 
A purchase by an attorney for his own benefit at a sale over which he has 
exercised any direction or control should always be closely scrutinized by the 
court. [Citation omitted]. 'Public policy and the analogies of the law require that 
10 
they should be considered per se as in the twilight between legal fraud and 
fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon slight 
additional facts * [Citation omitted] 
A 
id. ;.. .Jf- jo u'iMpiiciM^ L-iL!-.ic:j). :\: achroeder v. Yuting, 161 U.S. 334, (] 896), '' the 
siibseqiient United States Supreme Court decision that affiijmed Young, the United States 
Supreme Court specifically addressed this attorney-as-purcjiaser situation: 
Although there is no general rule that an attorney m^y not purchase at an 
execution sale, provided it be not done to the prejudice of his own clients, [citation 
omitted] such purchase in itself is calculated to thrdw a doubt upon the fairness of 
the sale, and as is quaintly said of such sales by the \Court of Appeals of Kentucky 
in Howell v. McCreeiy, 7 Dana, 388: Tublic policy and the analogies of law 
require that they should be considered per se as in the twilight between legal fraud 
and fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, upon 
slight additional facts " [Citations omitted] 
Id. a I: 340 (emphasis added). I he P> per court: followed Young in acknowledging this 
exact same attorney-as-purchaser situation existed in the present dispute, and thus 
justified requiring only slight irregularities. Pyper, 2009 UfT App 331, ^ 1 2 . 1 fi-17. ?0, 
In so holding, JAC r\per cour t clear 1}- and correctl) followed Utah and United States 
Supreme Court precedent. 
(b)« fii Both Young and Pyper, Lawyers'Who Participated in the 
Sheriffs Sales and then Purchased the Creditors' Properties 
Misled the Creditors During the Subsequent Six-Month 
Redemption Period 
Another striking similarity between Young and Pypfer again involves the lawyers 
participating in the sheriffs sales. In Young, lawyers for the creditors misled and made 
misrepresentations to Liic debtors after the actual sheriff sales (there were three) by telling 
4
 A copy of Schroeder is attached in the Appendix as exhibit number 2. 
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the creditor they would not enforce the six-month statutory redemption period: 
after said several sales had been made, and before the time for redemption had 
expired, [attorney] Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory time for 
redemption would not be insisted upon . . . 
Young, 37 P. at 253. Relying thereon, the debtor in Young allowed the redemption 
period to expire. Id. 
In the present case Pyper called the Attorneys (J. Bond and Dorius - J. Bond set 
up the sheriffs sale and was the buyer at the sheriffs sale; Dorius was his law partner at 
the time) approximately 28 times by phone during the redemption period, asking for a 
payoff on the judgment. Rather than scorn Pyper, tell him to stop calling, tell him to find 
his own attorney, or tell him no such payoff would be forthcoming, the Attorneys instead 
strung Pyper along by telling him they would call him back with a payoff number. Pyper 
relied on their promises, and the knowledge that they were attorneys bound by ethical 
obligations,5 and so waited for their return call. He did not receive the return call, and so 
peppered then: law office with many phone calls. 
5
 The Pyper court noted, "As Pyper's former counsel, [the Attorneys] had some 
obligation not to take advantage of Pyper* s known ignorance." Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 
at1fl7 (footnote omitted) (citing Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 2001 UT 107. 
Tfl|52-53 (discussing continuing nature of attorney's duties of confidentiality and loyalty 
after termination of attorney-client relationship)); see also, Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct 4.3(a) ("When the lawyer knows or reasonably should know that the 
unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in the matter, the lawyer shall 
make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding/*); Rule 14-301 of the Standards 
of Professionalism and Civility, Preamble ("Lawyers should exhibit courtesy, candor and 
cooperation in dealing with the public and participating in the legal system/'): Rule 14-
301(6) of the Standards of Professionalism and Civility ("Lawyers shall adhere to their 
express promises and agreements, oral or written, and to all commitments reasonably 
implied by the circumstances or by local custom/5) 
12 
Pyper s experience with the Attorneys' poor communications and unfulfilled 
promises was not his alone, His attorney had the same phoifLe call with Dorius. received 
the same promise of a i eturn call wi th a payoff amoi int. and received the same response 
accorded to Pyper - no return call. As a result, the Attorneys' misrepresentations caused 
Pyper to wait just long enough for the six-month redemption period to expire. Both the 
\ 11--: CoLiri and i-'\ per court found that these facts amounted to circumstances sufficient 
to satisfy the M.', ".J part of the Young test. 
In sum, the present case tracks along Young in three)critical areas: (1) the present 
case, even more than Young, consisted of an appalling sacrjfice of the debtor's property 
wiuw.. i> exiacii, ^ii^;; cumpcinuLi uic \. !,. v\\':^ • ''•••• **- property sold at the sheriff *"s 
s;dr u. • * v r-rkv *\iid for said nrr^cn\. 12 :• lawyers were heavily involved in the conduct 
of the sheriffs sales and subsequent redemption period, and in fact, purchased the 
debtor's property at said sales, and (.• / u;^  id\v\ er> in\ o\\ iu in me purcna^e oi Uie 
debtor's property at said sales subsequently mislead the debtor di iri rig the six-month 
redemption period such that said period expired to the detriment of the debtor.6 
6
 Interestingly, in discussing Young in detail the court in Hjuston v. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531. 
535-6 (Utah 1991) cited these three key facts in reaffirming Young: 
[1] Land worth $26,000 was sold to satisfy a judgment of $1,700, [2] the 
purchasers were the attorneys for the judgment debtor. [3] the purchasers directed 
the land to be sold in parcels in a manner that prevented the land from being sold 
at a fair price, and [4] the purchasers assured the debtor that they would not insist 
on the statutory period for redemption. 
Id. at 536 (citing Young, 37 P. at 254-56). 
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3. The Attorneys' Criticism of the Pyper Court's Reliance on Pender is 
Misplaced 
In their Brief of Appellants, the Attorneys take umbrage with the Pyper court's 
reliance on Pender (see, Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 at ^15). arguing that, "In Pender, the 
debtor was deliberately misled by the purchaser/' (See, Brief of Appellant at 13). The 
Attorneys further complain about the two additional factors cited in ^15 of the Pyper 
decision, stating, "Both of these [factors] in Pender are again affirmative actions by the 
purchaser that directly influenced the sale and impeded the redemption process." Id. The 
Attorneys misapprehend the Pyper court's reliance on Pender. 
The Pyper court relied on Pender to support the conclusion that the "irregularities 
attending the sale" include any irregularities that occur during the redemption period. In 
fact, such redemption-period irregularities occurred in Pender when the creditor and his 
attorney exhibited "studious silence" about their intent to collect the judgment despite 
repeated contact with the debtor and his attorney both before and after the execution sale. 
Pender, 265 P.2d at 648. This conduct was not an "affirmative action[]" of the creditor, 
as the Attorneys claim. Nor does it show that the creditor deliberately misled the debtor, 
as asserted by the Attorneys. It is passive conduct - i.e. "studious silence." Contrast the 
"studious silence" of the creditor and his attorneys in Pender with the not-so-silent 
Attorneys in the present case who (personally or through staff) affirmatively told Pyper 
they would call him back and get him a payoff figure. The affirmative 
misrepresentations in the present case clearly go above and beyond Pender's "studious 
14 
silence/' where that court affirmed the trial court's conclusi6n that the sale at issue there 
"was attended by unfairness and was tainted with fraud." Id. at 648. 
Similar to the redemption-period irregularities noted above in Pender and Young, 
such irregularities ciw ,»ko be found in one of the three maii|i cases cited and quoted by 
the Young court. In Graffam v. Burgess. 1 i T U.S. 180. 182 (1886), after the actual 
sheriffs sale, the judgment-creditor Graffam "and the other! defendants meanwhile 
conspired toge ther to keep [the debtor] in. ignorance oft] ic [sheriffs] saU • * •-• > =• 
allowed by the statutes of Massachusetts for redeeming the property, had expired." Thus. 
Graffam, Pender and Young all considered redemption-peribd irregularities in deciding 
whether to equitably extend the redemption period. 
4. 1 tut I r i.il i 'iMiiiii i .iiiiid Pyper Court Decisions Comport with Huston 
The Attorneys argue that in affirming the Trial Court's ruling in favor of Pyper, 
the Pyper court failed to follow Huston, supra. Specifically the Attorneys claim that the 
controlling test ^ based on Huston and requires the following l\v» fau^r^ the hndinj of 
exceptional circumstances as well as compelling equities. ([See, Brief of Appellants at 
1
 Although the Attorneys are loathe to expand the reach of equity, but quick to restrict it 
Utah caselaw views equity differently. Equity is defined as "fairness" or the "body of 
principles constituting what is fair and right." Black's Law Dictionary 443 (7th ed. 2000). 
"The purpose of an equity action is to restore the parties to the status quo to the extent 
possible." Horton v. Horton, 695 P.2d 102, 107 (Utah 1984), "It is inherent in the nature 
and purpose of equity that it will grant relief only when fairness and good conscience so 
demand. Jacobson v. Jacobson, 557 P.2d 156, 158 (Utah 1976). Another purpose of 
equity "is the prevention of injustice . . ." Valley Bank & Trust Co. v. Rite Way 
Concrete Forming. 742 P.2d 105, 108 (Utah 1987). 
15). Apparently, jettisoning the two-part Young test (which the Attorneys asserted in 
their Brief of Appellants to the Pyper court below),8 the Attorneys prefer another two-part 
test containing seemingly different verbiage. 
First, the Attorneys misstate Huston. After reviewing Young, Mollerup v. Storage 
Systems International 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), and the applicable legal principles 
therein, the Huston court concluded, "a court should take such an action only when the 
equities of the case are compelling and 'move the conscience of the court."5 Huston, 818 
P.2dat535. 
Second, the antecedent source of the legal principles in Huston is Young. See, 
e.g., Young 37 P. at 254 ("If the inadequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience 
of all fair and impartial minds . . . " ) . Thus, these Huston principles are essentially 
synonymous with the Young two-part test. 
Third, the Trial Court concluded that the inadequacy of purchase price "shocks the 
conscience of an impartial mind." (See, Memorandum Decision at 8). Regarding this 
conclusion, the Pyper court stated, "We do not disagree with the district court's 
determinations that the sale of Pyper*s $75,000 of equity in the property for $329 . . . 
'shocks the conscience of an impartial mind5 . . ." Pyper, 2009 UT App 331 at ^ [12 n 5. 
Thus, both courts below considered and used these Huston legal principles. 
Further, it is self evident that both the Trial Court and Pyper court felt the equities 
of the present case were compelling enough and provided exceptional circumstances 
8
 See, the Attorneys' Brief of Appellant submitted to the Pyper court at 11-12. 
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sufficient to extend the redemption period. 1 he dissenting judge in Pvper. Judge Da\ is, 
clearly indicated so in the open ing paragraph of his dissent. Id. at f22. For the Attorneys 
to ignore the Young two-part test and then argue that the Pvj)er court erred in not 
expressly stating that the equities of this case were compelling and sn^k^. i:-
conscience of the coi tit is to turn this dispute into a battle of semantics. 
The Pyper decision thus comports with the equitable principles enumerated in 
Huston relating to equitably extending the redemption period. 
The A ttorneys5 concludi ng argument is that Pyper establishes bad precedent. The 
Attorneys, however, support this allegation with conclusory [statements and a concerted 
effort to conveniently turn a blind eye to the facts. I ruly; facts are stubborn things for the 
Attorneys. 
The Attorneys' doomsday claims of unwise precedent can be summarized as: (1) a 
sheriffs sale can now be attacked at any time after the end of the redemption period by 
merely alleging even the slimmest instances of unfairness. (2) debtors now nee :I do 
nothing but sit idly by for 90% of the redemption period and then allege he or she made 
several unreturned phone calls, and (3) even if a purchaser makes no affirmative actions 
or representations during the redemption process the sale can still be attacked b\ merely 
alleging the debtor made a fe\\ i in reti lined phone ca lis. (See, Brief of Appellants at 16). 
These allegations of unwise precedent completely (and conveniently) ignore the 
shocking sacrifice the Attorneys seek of Pyper's property - |a property valued at $125,000 
1 7 
(when the liens were all removed) - for a paltry $329, and which still left the Attorneys 
with their $10,577.23 judgment (less the $329 credit bid). No case cited by either side in 
this dispute even comes close to providing a greater sacrifice of a debtor's property than 
the present sacrifice sought by the Attorneys. The Attorneys clearly ignore this fact in 
arguing 'unwise precedent.' 
The Attorneys also ignore the fact that they and their staff affirmatively told Pyper 
more than once on the telephone that they would get back to him with a payoff. The 
Attorneys amazingly overlook this fact, and instead claim Pyper is simply relying on 
unreturned phone calls, and that the Attorneys and their staff made no affirmative 
representations to Pyper during the redemption period regarding a payoff which he relied 
on. The Attorneys, of course, dispute this claiming that they and their staff never made 
such representations. However, the Trial Court, as trier of fact, was on hand to observe 
testimony from the parties and clearly weighed this disputed testimony in favor of Pyper. 
(See, Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact ^21-26, 44, and p. 8). The precedent 
created by this critical fact (i.e. attorney purchasers at a sheriff sale misleading the debtor 
during the redemption period) was established long ago with Young and Pender. Pyper 
produces no new precedent on this point. 
The Attorneys also ignore the undisputed fact that they are just that - attorneys. 
They also previously represented Pyper. The line of cases demanding a thorough review 
of lawyer conduct in similar cases started well before Pyper was decided. If such a fact 
creates unwise precedent, then the whole line of cases beginning with Young needs to be 
18 
o\ erti irned. 
Further, the claim that Pyper sat idly by as the six month redemption period 
transpired is a myth. Pyper testified at trial that during the redemption period he had to 
clear title to his proper iy in order to obtain a loan against his properly that could pa\ off 
the A ttorneys' ji idgrnent, and that he cleared four or five different liens during the 
redemption period. (R. at 450, p. 90).9 One such encumbrance on title was a "large bank 
lien" which Pyper was able to reconvey, thereby completely clearing title 10 lus property 
except for the A ttorneys' judgment lien (R at 450, p. 90 -91). Pyper also helpe d his s :)ii 
qualify for the bank loan that would be used, in part, to pay the Attorneys' judgment, and 
which would be recorded against Pyper9s property'. (R. at 450, p. 94, 116). In addition to 
rem;ir;e;! r.vMc. u,:-r. durir-2 ihc ^Icmp^-n neriod, contrary to the claims of the Attorneys 
and Judge Davis. 
Finally, at the end o; Luc rind ol Appellants, the Attorneys cite Mollerup v. 
Storage Systems International 569 P 2d 1 ] 22 (I Jta h 1977) for its use of "substantial" to 
modify the "irregularities" needed to upset a sheriffs sale. Id. at 1124. Although 
Mollerup cites generally to Young for this conclusion, Your|g referenced the adjective 
"substantial" just once. After the Young court stating its holding,11 ' it applied the holding 
Copies of these trial transcript excerpts are included in tl le Appendix as exhib.it 
number 3. 
10
 Young's holding is, "All the cases unite in the doctrine thjat on gross inadequacy of 
to the specific facts before it: "This is not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of price 
alone, but one where the sales complained of were attended by such substantial 
irregularities as must have prevented a sale at a fair sum." Young, 37 P. at 254 (emphasis 
added). This reference in Young to the adjective "substantial" does not modify Young's 
holding. Instead, this adjective merely characterizes the facts before the Young court and 
indicates that such facts meet and exceed the second part of the two-part Young test, 
which requires only that "irregularities" attend the sale. 
This interpretation of Young's use of the adjective "substantial" is confirmed in 
Schroeder, supra, where the United States Supreme Court affirmed Young. In Schroeder, 
the court held: "the general proposition laid down, as above stated, that if, [1] in addition 
to inadequacy of price [2] there be other circumstances throwing a shadow upon the 
fairness of the transaction, the judgment debtor will be allowed to redeem." Schroeder, 
161 U.S. at 339-340 (emphasis and numbers added). Interestingly, in analyzing and re-
stating Young's holding, the Schroeder court completely omitted the adjective 
"substantial." Instead, "slight" was the only adjective Schroeder used to modify 
"irregularities." Id. at 340 (citations omitted). This use of "slight" by Schroeder was in 
the case where a creditor's lawyer was the purchaser at the sheriffs sale (id. at 340), the 
same situation in the present appeal. 
price, coupled with irregularities attending the sale . . . it is the duty of the courts to set 
the sale aside . . ." Young, 37 P. at 254 (citations omitted). 
20 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should affirm the Court of Appeals5 decision in 
Pyper. 
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PRIOR HISTORY: [***1] APPEAL from the dis-
trict court of the third judicial district, Hon. G. W. 
Bartch, Judge. 
Action by John M. Young against A. T. Schroeder 
and wife to obtain a decree adjudging certain deeds, exe-
cuted by the U.S. marshal pursuant to certain execution 
sales, to be fraudulent, and that the plaintiff be permitted 
to redeem from such sales, notwithstanding the statutory 
time for redemption had expired, and that the defendants 
be required to convey to him the property mentioned and 
described in said deeds. From a decree for plaintiff, de-
fendants appeal. 
DISPOSITION: Affirmed. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Plaintiff debtor filed suit 
against defendant attorneys to obtain a decree adjudging 
certain deeds to be fraudulent and an order that the 
debtor be permitted to redeem the property and that the 
attorneys be required to convey the property to him. The 
District Court, Third Judicial District (Utah), entered a 
decree for the debtor. The attorneys appealed. 
OVERVIEW: A corporation obtained a default judg-
ment against the debtor in the amount of about $ L600. 
The attorneys represented the corporation in that suit. 
The debtor and his sister obtained property as tenants in 
common. The property was worth $ 25,000. An execu-
tion was4ater issued4o a,U.S. marshal, directing him to 
levy on sufficient personal property to satisfy the judg-
ment. The marshal attached and levied on all the debtor's 
property after being unable to find personal property. 
The attorneys purchased two lots for themselves at the 
execution sales. The attorneys told the debtor that the 
statutory time for redemption would not be insisted upon. 
As a result, the debtor allowed the period for redemption 
to lapse. Before bringing suit, the debtor offered to pay 
the attorneys the full amount of the corporation's judg-
ment against him, but they refused. On appeal, the court 
held that the district court properly awarded the debtor 
relief because not only was there a gross inadequacy of 
price, the record showed that the attorneys, who became 
purchasers, so directed and controlled the officer charged 
with the duty of executing the writ as to lead to a sacri-
fice of the debtor's property. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the district court's de-
cree. 
CORE TERMS: feet, parcel, marshal irregularity, 
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execution sales, attended, insisted, redeem, notice 
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Evidence > Inferences & Presumptions > Rebuttal of 
Presumptions 
[HN1] Whenever the court perceives that a sale of prop-
erty has been made at a grossly inadequate price, such as 
would shock a correct mind, this inadequacy furnishes a 
strong, and, in general, a conclusive, presumption, 
though there be no direct proof of fraud, that an undue 
advantage has been taken of the ignorance, weakness, or 
the distress or necessity of the vendor; and this imposes 
on the purchaser a necessity to remove this violent pre-
sumption by the clearest evidence of fairness of his con-
duct. 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution 
Contracts Law > Defenses > Fraud & Misrepresenta-
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[HN2] If the inadequacy of price is so gross as to shock 
the conscience, or if, in addition to gross inadequacy, the 
purchaser has been guilty of any unfairness, or has taken 
any undue advantage, or if the owner of the property or 
party interested has been for any other reason misled or 
surprised, then the sale will be regarded as fraudulent 
and void, or the party injured will be permitted to redeem 
the property sold. Great inadequacy requires only slight 
circumstances of unfairness in the conduct of the party 
benefited by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud. 
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[HNS] On gross inadequacy of price, coupled with ir-
regularities attending the sale, especially where such 
irregularities are not merely formal and technical, but 
such as have a direct tendency to prevent the realizing of 
a fair price for the property sold, and are attributable to 
the purchaser at the sale, it is the duty of the courts to set 
the sale aside, unless the complaining party is estopped 
by his own laches. 
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[HN5] A purchase by an attorney for his own benefit at a 
sale over which he has exercised any direction or control 
should always be closely scrutinized by the court. Public 
policy and the analogies of the law require that they 
should be considered per se as in the twilight between 
legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudu-
lent, or in trust I for the debtor, upon slight additional 
facts. 
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land worth $ 26,000, is sold in sepa-
sa i^sfy a judgment of $ 1,700, and the pur-
execution sales except one are the at-
judgment creditor, and that to the extent of 
officer with descriptions of the property to 
and sold, they directed and controlled the 
court and directed and required the offi-
and sell the property in such parcels as 
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rendered it impossible to realize at the sale a fair price, 
but led to a sacrifice of the debtor's property, such sales 
will be set aside and the judgment debtor allowed to re-
deem on an equitable basis even after the statutory time 
for redemption has expired, especially when the sales 
were attended with many and serious irregularities for 
which the parties claiming through the sales were re-
sponsible, and when one of the attorneys of the judgment 
creditor assured the judgment debtor that the statutory 
period of redemption would not be insisted upon, who 
relied upon this assurance and allowed the period of re-
demption to elapse. Semble, that the conduct of one 
member of a firm or copartnership not a party to the suit, 
about a matter not within the general scope of the part-
nership business, sufficient to create an estoppel against 
him, operates so as to bind another member of the firm 
sought to be charged, who had no knowledge of and did 
not participate in the acts creating the estoppel. 
2. ID.--ID.--GROSS INADEQUACY OF PRICE.-
LACHES.— Courts will set aside execution sales when it 
appears that the price obtained was grossly inadequate, 
and that the sales were coupled with irregularities, not 
merely formal and technical, but such as have a direct 
tendency to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the 
property sold, when such irregularities are attributable to 
the purchasers at the sales, unless the complaining party 
is estopped by his own laches. 
3. ID.--ID.--EXCESSIVE LEVY.-VOID SALE.-
Where- an-exeoution-was i&sued-and -the officer-levied-it 
upon and sold certain property of the judgment debtor 
and returned it into court unsatisfied to the amount of $ 
136, and another execution was issued which the officer 
levied upon certain other property of the judgment 
debtor, which he afterwards sold to satisfy the alleged 
balance of $ 136, and after deducting his fees, expenses 
and commissions therefrom amounting to $ 30, paid the 
balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of the judgment creditor, 
when in fact, there was only $ 25.57 due at the time of 
issuing the last execution. Held, that this was not an ir-
regularity, merely such as would render the sale void-
able, but the levy and sale being excessive, the sale was 
absolutely void. 
COUNSEL: Messrs. Rawlins & Critchlow and Messrs. 
Jones & Schroeder, for appellants. 
The court erred in permitting plaintiff to testify about a 
conversation had with Stephens relative to the redemp-
tion of the property. Stephens is not a party to the suit, 
and it related to a matter foreign to the scope of the part-
nership business. At the time plaintiff did not know that 
either Stephens or Schroeder had any interest in or con-
trol over the property. Jackson v. Bartless, 8 Johns. 381; 
4 L. Ed. 57; Anderson v. Tompkins, 1 Fed. Cas. 851, No. 
365. The mere relation of joint ownership of property is 
not enough to constitute each owner [***2] the agent of 
the other to bind him by fraud. 1 Bige. on Fraud, 223. 
Plaintiff and his cotenants had divided the land into dis-
tinct lots, and a conveyance of all plaintiffs interest in 
any one lot is valid and effectual against his cotenants. 
Freeman on Coten. 282, § 208; Butler v. Roys, 25 Mich 
53; S, C. 12 Am; Rep. 218; Jackson v. Newton, 18 Johns. 
355. 
The court found that at the date of the first sale, Stephens 
did not know of the existence of any other property, and 
then in another finding that he had formed an intention to 
exhaust all of plaintiffs property. Inconsistent findings 
will not sustain a judgment. Reese v. Corcoran, 52 Cal. 
495; Manley v. Howlet, 55 Cal. 94; Harris v. Harris, 59 
Cal 116; Kloss v. Alleman, 64 Cal. 87. There were three 
separate sales under two different executions. The court 
cannot grant entire relief in one action unless there was a 
common fraudulent intent as to all. Finding 10 makes 
such intent impossible. 2 Comp. Laws, § 3220; Wallen v. 
Ruskan, 12 How. Pr. 28; Henderson v. Jackson, 40 How. 
Pr. 168. As long as a judicial sale stands, the purchase 
price as between the parties is a conclusive test of its 
value. Snyder v. Blair, 33 N. J. Eq. [***3] 208. Where 
there is a conflict of evidence on material issues, the 
finding of the court is not conclusive on appeal, like the 
verdict of a jury or the finding of a common law court, 
and the supreme court will review the facts as well as the 
4 a w . - ^ ^ ^ v r ^ ^ t o , - ^ ^ ^ ^ - 7^2;-Sr €.-1 -7-S.- Wr R, 
706; Cheney v. Roodhouse, 135 Ills. 25; Droster v. Muel-
ler, 103 Mo. 624; U. S. v. Old Settlers, 148 U.S. 427; 37 
L. Ed. 587. Fraud on the part of the purchaser must be 
shown, in addition to inadequacy of consideration. Sim-
mons v. Vandegrift, 1 N. J. Eq. 55. There must be fraud 
to give a court of equity jurisdiction. Irregularity is not 
sufficient. Cavanaugh v. Jakeway, Walker Ch. 344; 
Hansford v. Barber, 3 A. K. Smith, 515. Some knowl-
edge and participation in the act claimed to be fraudulent 
must be proved upon the party sought to be charged. The 
mere relationship of joint ownership to the property is 
not enough to constitute each owner the agent of the 
other to bind him by false representations in an unauthor-
ized sale of the whole property. Bige. on Fraud, 223; 
Holmes v. Wood, 32 Ind. 201; Arthur v. Griswold, 55 N. 
Y 400; Peny v. Hale, 143 Mass. 540; S C. 10 N. E. 174. 
The court nowhere [***4] finds that the defendant is 
guilty of actual fraud, and a failure so to find is equiva-
lent to a finding against the plaintiff. Elliot App. Proc. § 
757; Young v. Berger, 32 N. E. 318. Even where the 
price paid is inadequate, in order to avoid the sale, it 
must be shown that the purchaser is in some measure 
responsible for it. White v. Wilson, 14 Ves. Jr. 151; 
Graffam v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 180; Russel v. Pew, 31 P. 
10 Utah 155, *, 37 P 252, **, 
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R 77, Hudgens v Monow, 47 Ark 515 The plamtiff 
the judgment debtor, knew of the execution sales and 
could have directed the officer, and havmg failed to do 
so cannot now complam of his own negligence 2 Comp 
Laws, § 3436, Jones v Townsend (Tenn), 5 Cen Law J 
202 Where there is time for redemption allowed by law, 
the judgment debtor must redeem or make a motion to 
have the sale set aside before the time of redemption 
expires Powers v Larabee, 57 N W 791, and cases 
Jones v Townsend (Tenn), 5 Cent Law J 202. Cool-
baugh v Roemer 32 Minn 445, Jenkins v Mem-
weather, 109 III 647, Stewart v Marshal, 4 G Green 
(la), 75, State Bank v Noland, 13 Aik 299 Love v 
Cherry, 24 la 210, Chambers v Stone 9 Ala 260,Aber-
crombie v Conner, 10 Ala 292, 2 [r***>'5] Freeman on 
Exec § 306, p 1039, Fletcher v McGill 110 Ind 406, 
Rigneyv Small, 60111 416, Johnson v Murray, 112 Lid 
154, Richey v Merritt, 108Ind 347, 9N E 368, Levari 
v Milholland, 114 Pa St 49 
In order to create an estoppel m pais, the representation 
must relate to a present or a past state of thmgs Langton 
v Doud, 10 Allen, 433, Jackson v Allen, 120 Mass 79, 
White v Ashton, 51 N Y 280 An estoppel from the rep-
resentation of a party can seldom arise, except where the 
representations relate to a fact, to a present or past state 
of thmgs Union Life Ins Co v Mowry, 96 U S 549, 24 
L Ed 676 The party estopped must have intended that 
his misrepresentations should be acted upon by the party 
who asserts the estoppel Zuchtman v Roberts, 109 
Mass 53 An attorney may purchase at an execution sale 
subject to the right of his client to claim the benefit 
thereof Smith v Black 115 US 308, 29 L Ed 398, 
Allen v Gillett, 127 US 589, 32 L Ed 271, Mining Co 
v Mason, 145 US 340, 36 L Ed 736 A levy upon part 
of a tract held as tenant in common is good as against 
judgment debtor The only persons who can complam are 
his cotenants Gregoiy [***~6] v Tozier, 24 Me 308, 
Goodwin v Gregg, 28 Me 188, Varnum v Abbott, 7 
Am Dec 87 In case the officer, after offermg the prop-
erty separately, sells en masse, such a sale is good Hill v 
F M N B, 97 US 450, Van Valkenbergv Trustees, 66 
III 103,Muggev Ginger, 59 Ind 195 
Mr W H Dickson and Messrs Williams, Van Cott & 
Sutherland, for respondents 
JUDGES: MERRITT, C J MINER and SMITH, JJ, 
concur 
OPINION BY: MERRITT 
OPINION 
[160] [**252] MERRITT, C J 
This action! was brought to obtam a decree of the 
court adjudging certain deeds (mentioned m the com-
plaint, and executed by the Umted States marshal of 
Utah territory pursuant to certain execution sales made 
under a judgment obtamed in the third district court by 
Clark Eldredge & Co, a corporation, against John M 
Young, the plaintiff, and others) to be fraudulent, and 
that the plamtiff be permitted to redeem from such sales, 
notwithstanding the statutory time for redemption had 
expired, and that defendants be required to convey to 
him the property mentioned and described m said deeds 
and complamt This relief was sought on the ground of 
gross inadequacy of the price obtamed at such sales 
coupled with [y *7] a great number of irregularities 
attending the sales, which led to the sacrifice of plam-
tiff s property The alleged irregularities are specifically 
set forth m the complaint, and also in the findings of the 
court below Upon the filing of the complamt the defen-
dants Frank B Stephens and wife [ ^ l ] made a satis-
factory settlement with the plamtiff, and in pursuance 
thereof conveyed to him all their interests m the property 
m controversy, and the suit as to these defendants was 
thereupon dismissed After that the defendants Schroeder 
and wife filed their answer, and a trial was had, which 
resulted in a judgment and decree m favor of plamtiff 
substantially as prayed for m the complamt, from which 
decree, and the d>rder denymg a new trial, this appeal is 
prosecuted 
The finding^ of fact made by the court below are 
very full We have carefully examined the record, and 
are satisfied that they are fully sustamed by the evidence 
From these findings it appears that on the 9th of Febru-
ary, 1891, ClarkJ Eldredge & Co, a corporation, com-
menced an action agamst John M Young (the plamtiff 
herein), Henry Gpddard, and George Goddard to recover 
$ 1,640 61, with interest from p"*^] January 3, 1891 
That afterwards a judgment by default was entered 
agamst the plamtiff (John M Young) on March 6, 1891, 
for $ 1,673 36, knd costs amounting to $ 30 50, said 
judgment bearing mterest at 1 per cent per month That 
Frank B Stephens and A T Schroeder, partners, were 
the attorneys for Clark, Eldredge & Co m said action, 
that the plamtiff, John M Young, and his sister, Lydia Y 
Merrill, were the owners m fee, as tenants m common, of 
all of that part of lot 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City 
survey, commencing 64 1/2 feet west from the northeast 
corner of said lot 2, thence west 611/2 feet, thence south 
20 rods, thence east 94 1/2 feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, 
thence east 311/2 feet, thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence 
west 16 1/2 feet, thence north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 
48 feet, thence north 49 1/2 feet, to the place of begin-
ning, and also lot 12 m block 8, Five-Acre Plat A, Big 
Field survey, m Salt Lake county, Utah That the title of 
the plamtiff and Lydia Y Merrill in each of said proper-
ties [^ 162] was derived from the last will and testament 
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of John Young, deceased, father of said John M. Young 
and Lydia Y. Merrill, and was subject to a right [***9] 
in Sarah Milton Young and Ann Olive Young to receive 
each one-fourth of the income arising from said proper-
ties during their respective lives. That the plaintiffs in-
terest in said portion of lot 2 at the times of the sales 
hereinafter mentioned was worth at least the sum of $ 
25,000, and his interest in said lot 12 was worth at least $ 
1,000. (There is an alley extending from north to south 
practically through the center of said portion of said lot 
2.) That on the 29th day of April, 1891, an execution was 
issued in said action of Clark, Eldredge & Co. to the 
United States marshal, directing him to levy on sufficient 
personal property to satisfy said judgment, and, if suffi-
cient personal property could not be found, then to levy 
on the real estate belonging to the defendants in said ac-
tion; and the marshal, being unable to find any personal 
property out of which to satisfy said judgment, did, on 
May 7, 1891, give notice that he attached and levied on 
[**253] all the right, title, claim, and interest of said 
plaintiff and his codefendants in said action in and to that 
certain parcel of land described as beginning 101 feet 
north and 39 1/2 feet east of the south-west corner of lot 
[***10] 2, block 70, Plat A, Salt Lake City survey, run-
ning thence east 15 1/2 feet, thence north 28 feet, thence 
west 15 1/2 feet, thence south 28 feet, to the place of 
beginning; and also on that part of the same lot described 
as beginning 32 1/2 feet west from the southeast corner 
of said lot, running thence west 38 feet, thence north 98 
1/3 feet>Jhence_east 38 f^t^thence_south^9_8_l/3_feet, to 
the place of beginning; and also on a part of lot 12, block 
8, Five-Acre Plat A, Big Field survey. That part of said 
lot 2 secondly described in said notice lies on the east 
side of said alley, while that portion firstly described in 
the notice lies on the west side. This last-mentioned por-
tion was [*163] carved out of the heart of that portion 
of said lot 2 owned as aforesaid by plaintiff and his sis-
ter, and there was no means of ingress to or egress from 
this portion so carved out of the larger tract. That the 
marshal, by his return, dated July 25, 1891, certified that 
under said writ he had sold the property described in the 
notice to John Clark, and, deducting his commissions 
and expenses of sale, paid the balance realized upon said 
sale, viz., $ 962.36, to the attorneys of Clark, Eldredge 
[***11] & Co., and further returned that there was still 
due and unpaid on said judgment the sum of $ 886.90. 
(The John Clark mentioned in the return was a director 
and the principal stockholder of Clark, Eldredge & Co.) 
On July 28, 1891, an alias execution issued from the 
said court in said action for the full sum of $ 1,673.36 
and $ 30.50 costs, directed to said marshal, and thereafter 
the marshal made return thereon to said court that he had 
levied on all the right, title, claim, and interest of said 
plaintiff and his codefendants in said action in and to that 
certain parcel of land described as beginning 64 1/2 feet 
west of the northeast corner of said lot 2, running thence 
west 45 1/2 feet, thence south 20 rods, thence east 78 1/2 
feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/4 feet, 
thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, thence 
north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence north 49 
1/2 feet, to the place of beginning; and certified by said 
return that he had sold all the premises last described to 
the said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroeder for the 
sum of $ 828.70: and further certified that the judgment 
obtained by said corporation was still unsatisfied to the 
extent [***12] of $ 100. (The marshal's return was erro-
neous in this: that the true balance was less than $ 26.) 
On the 30th of September, 1891, said marshal made a 
further return to said last-mentioned writ, in which he 
certified that on September 30, 1891, he sold all of lot 
12, block 8, Five-Acre [*164] Plat A, Big Field survey, 
situate in Salt Lake county, and also all that certain par-
cel of land described as beginning 39 feet east and 81 
feet north of the southwest corner of said lot 2, running 
thence north 209 feet, thence east 16 1/2 feet, thence 
south 209 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, to the place of 
beginning, to said Frank B. Stephens and A. T. Schroe-
der, for the sum of $ 136; and that, deducting the costs 
and expenses of said last levy, amounting to $ 30, paid 
the balance, $ 106, to the attorneys of said Clark, El-
dredge & Co., and returned said writ fully satisfied. All 
of that part of lot 2 firstly described in this statement, a 
plat of which appears in the record, constitutes a single 
parcel of land, and should be regarded and treated as 
such, and no^ as Jbeingdiyided into separate lots_ or par-
eels; and each and every parcel of said lot 2, block 70, 
plat A, so sold under said several [***13] writs of exe-
cution, was a part and portion of that part of said lot 2 
which the said John M. Young derived title to under the 
will of John Young, deceased, as aforesaid. 
It further appears that said Stephens furnished the 
marshal from time to time, with a description of the 
property to be levied upon and sold under said execu-
tions, and that the officer did levy and sell, from time to 
time, according to the descriptions furnished him by said 
Stephens. That the property so sold to said Clark was 
afterwards, and prior to the commencement of this ac-
tion, conveyed by Clark by quitclaim deed to said 
Stephens & Shroeder, and that the same was bid in by 
said Stephens for said Clark. That the other portions of 
said lot 2, sold under said several executions, and said lot 
12, were bid in at said sales by Stephens for himself and 
Shroeder, and that at none of said sales was there any 
other bidder than Stephens, nor was either of said sales 
attended by any person other than Stephens and the offi-
cer conducting the sales. At the time the last of these 
sales was made, to-wit, on 30th September [*165] 1891, 
the balance due Clark, Eldredge & Co. on said judgment 
amounted to $ 25.57, and no more, [***14] while the 
property of the plaintiff was sold for $ 136 at such sale, $ 
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106 of which was by the marshal paid to Stephens & 
Schrooder, no part of which was ever accounted for to 
plaintiff It further appears that after said several sales 
had been made and before the time for redemption had 
expired, Stephens informed the plaintiff that the statutory 
time for redemption would not be insisted upon, that the 
plaintiff, believing and relymg upon such promise and 
assurance, allowed the period for redemption to elapse 
without redeeming any of said property from said sales, 
and that marshal's deeds were given to the purchasers at 
said sales in pursuance of the statute m such cases made 
and provided It further appears that said lot 12 had been 
sold for taxes for the year 1890, and also for the year 
1891 and that m the month of April, 1892, after Schroe-
der had obtained the marshal's deed for said lot 12, he 
was informed that the plaintiff was about to redeem said 
lot 12 from both of said [**v*254] tax sales, and that he 
well understood at the time that plaintiff was unaware of 
the fact that said lot 12 had been sold under execution, 
nevertheless he permitted the plaintiff to redeem said 
[***15] property from said tax sales, and purposely 
concealed from him the fact that said property had been 
so sold under execution, and that he and his partner. 
Stephens, then held the marshal's deed therefor 
It further appears from the record that it was the de-
sign and purpose of Stephens & Schroeder at the outset 
to exhaust, if possible, all the property of plaintiff, of 
whatever nature or description, regardless of its value, 
under said several executions, and that they m fact ac-
complished that purpose Prior to the commencement of 
this action, plaintiff offered to pay to Stephens & 
Schroeder the full amount of the Clark, Eldredge & Co 
judgment, [*166] together with the mterest thereon at 
the rate of 1 per cent per month, to compensate Stephens 
& Schroeder liberally for all services and trouble that 
they had rendered or been put to m the premises, to repay 
all or any advances which they, or either of them, might 
have made on account of the property, with mterest 
thereon, and, in addition, to give them a bonus of $ 1,000 
if they would reconvey said properties to plaintiff, which 
offer they declmed and refused to accept Such, m brief, 
is the history of the transaction by [r'*'v16] which the 
plaintiff was stripped of all his possessions, and his 
property, worth at the tune $ 26 000 or more, was taken 
to satisfy a judgment of about $ 1,700 An additional 
feature of the transaction is that Stephens & Schroeder 
were members of the bar. attorneys for the judgment 
creditors, who thus, under the forms of law and the proc-
esses of the court, sought to enrich themselves without 
any consideration for the rights of the judgment debtor, 
and who proceeded m disregard of the injustice and op-
pression to which he was thereby subjected 
It is this transaction which appellants ask this court 
to approve We find ourselves unable to yield to the ap-
peal We may sdy, with the supreme court of the United 
States m the case of Byers v Surget, infra "It seems 
pertinent here to inquire under what system of civil pol-
ity, under what code of law or ethics, a transaction like 
that disclosed by the record m this case can be excused 
or even palliated " It is insisted by appellants that mere 
madequacy of price, however gross, will not authorize 
the courts to set aside a judicial sale The general rule 
undoubtedly is pat mere madequacy of price, alone, 
does not authorize the [y r r17] disturbance of such a 
sale, but we are not prepared to sanction the unqualified 
statement of the rule as put by appellants' counsel If the 
madequacy is so gross as at once to shock the conscience 
of all fair and Hi67] impartial mmds, if the sacrifice is 
such that every honest man would hesitate to take advan-
tage of it, it maw well be doubted whether every such 
case would be beyond the power of a court of equity to 
relieve against 
In Byers v Surget 19 How (U S ), it is said on page 
311 "To meet the objection made to the sale m this case, 
founded upon thi madequacy of the price for which the 
land was sold, it is msisted that the madequacy of con-
sideration simply cannot amount to proof of fraud This 
position, however, is scarcely reconcilable with the 
qualification annexed to it by the courts, viz, unless such 
madequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience, for 
this qualification implies necessarily the affirmation that, 
if the madequacy be of a nature so gross as to shock the 
conscience, it will amount to proof of fraud" In the case 
of Butler v Haskell, 4 Desaus Eq 651, the chancellor 
says "I consider the result of the great body of the cases 
[****18] to be that, [HN1] wherever the court perceives 
that a sale of property has been made at a grossly inade-
quate price, such as would shock a correct mind, this 
madequacy furnishes a strong, and, m general, a conclu-
sive, presumption, though there be no direct proof of 
fraud, that an undue advantage has been taken of the 
ignorance, weakness, or the distress or necessity of the 
vendor, and this imposes on the purchaser a necessity to 
remove this violent presumption by the clearest evidence 
of fairness of his Conduct" 
In Graffam -\\ 
29 L Ed 839, 
says "From the 
eral conclusion 
so gross as to 
gross madequacy] 
unfairness, or ha^ 
owner of the 
any other reason 
regarded as 
injured will be pi 
Great madequacy 
unfairness m the 
the 
Burgess, 117 US 180, 6 S Ct 686, 
supreme court of the United States 
cjases here cited we may draw the gen-
[HN2] if the madequacy of price is 
shejek the conscience, or if, m addition to 
the purchaser has been guilty of any 
taken any undue advantage, or if the 
proberty or party mterested has been for 
misled or surprised, then the sale will be 
frauqulent and void, or [168] the party 
amitted to redeem the property sold 
requires only slight circumstances of 
i***19] conduct of the party benefited 
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by the sale to raise the presumption of fraud" All the 
cases unite in the doctrine that [HN3] on gross inade-
quacy of price, coupled with irregularities attending the 
sale, especially where such irregularities are not merely 
formal and technical, but such as have a direct tendency 
to prevent the realizing of a fair price for the property 
sold, and are attributable to the purchaser at the sale, it is 
the duty of the courts to set the sale aside, unless the 
complaining party is estopped by his own laches 
Chamblee v Tarbox, 84 Am Dec 614, Howell v Baker, 
4 Johns Ch 118, Nesbitt v Dallam, 28 Am Dec 236, 
Morris v Robey 73 III 462, Byers v Surget, 60 US 
303, 19 HOW 303, 15 L Ed 670, Graffam v Burgess, 
117 US 180 6S Ct 686 29L Ed 839 
This is not a case which rests on mere inadequacy of 
price alone, but one where the sales complamed of were 
attended by such substantial irregularities as must have 
prevented a sale at a fair sum For instance, one of the 
parcels of said lot 2 levied upon and sold under the first 
execution, is described [*w255] as beginning 101 feet 
north and 39 1/2 feet [^ ^^20] east of the southwest cor-
ner of said lot 2, thence east 15 1/2 feet, north 28 feet, 
west 15 1/2 feet, and south 28 feet to the beginning Ref-
erence to the plat in evidence shows that the property 
thus described is a portion of that part of lot 2 to which 
plaintiff and his sister derived title through the will of 
their deceased father, as before stated, and is mcluded 
within the exterior boundaries of that portion thereof 
shownjby thejecord tojhaye been, at that time leased_to 
one Gebhardt The purchaser of the part thus levied on 
and sold by the marshal acquired a piece of land havmg 
no means of access to it It is needless to say that such a 
transaction must necessarily result in a sacrifice of the 
property Again, in the sales made under [*169] the 
several executions of portions of said lot 2 it appears that 
in each instance the levy was upon and the sale of all the 
plaintiffs right, title, and interest in a specific part of the 
portion of said lot 2 so owned by him and his sister, 
Lydia Y Merrill This is also an irregularity that renders 
the sale voidable, if not void, the necessary tendency of a 
sale under such a levy being to depreciate the value of 
the property sold 
[^ v*v*21] In Freeman on Cotenancy and Partition 
(section 216), under the headmg of "Conveyance of Part 
under Execution," it is said "We have already seen that 
the decisions determining the effect of a conveyance 
made by a cotenant, and purporting to convey his mterest 
m some specified parcel, are very inharmonious The 
reasons which exist m the case of a voluntary are some-
what different from those accompanymg an involuntary 
conveyance [HN4] The purchase of the grantor's mterest 
in a specified parcel is, m effect, a wager that such parcel 
will be set off to him on partition, or otherwise con-
firmed to him by the other cotenants Still, if such cir-
cumstances exist that the grantor sees fit to make, and the 
grantee to accept, a conveyance which may, in the event 
of an unfavorable partition, convey nothing, we can see 
no \alid reason for denymg the utmost effect to the deed 
which it can be given, consistently with the rights of the 
other cotenants But in the case of an involuntary transfer 
of property the mterest of the person whose estate is to 
be divested by compulsion ought to be carefully consid-
ered and jealously guarded If an officer may lawfully 
levy on a specific parcel and subject [v***v'22] it to forced 
sale, he may thereby sacrifice the property of the defen-
dant, for few persons would be found willing to bid for 
that which, when purchased, consisted of a mere contin-
gent interest,--an mterest which the other cotenants were 
not bound to notice, and which might be finally lost upon 
a partition of the common property [*170] Hence the 
rule, supported by a decided preponderance of the au-
thorities, is that the levy and sale of the debtor's interest 
in a specific part of the lands cannot be sustamed" See 
also, Starr v Leavitt, 2 Conn 243, Smith v Benson 9 Vt 
138 and the cases cited m note to Smith v Huntoon (III 
Sup), 134III 24, 24NE 971, 23 Am St Rep 651 
The rights of the cotenants of the judgment are not 
affected by the sale In proceedmgs instituted by them 
for partition of the common property they can ignore the 
same, and the result of the partition may be to deprive 
the purchaser at such judicial sale of that which he bid 
and paid for Such bemg the hazard which the purchaser 
must necessarily take^ it is not reasonable to suppose that 
any one would bid a fair price for the property The wis-
dom of the rule announced [^^^23] in the cases just 
cited is exemplified by the facts of this case That part of 
lot 2 m controversy is but 94 1/2 feet m width east and 
west It is cut through the center from north to south by 
an alleyway, and the record discloses that it could be 
most equitably divided between the cotenants. the plain-
tiff and his sister, by allotting to one all of that part lymg 
on the east, and to the other all that lying on the west, of 
the alley But it will be remembered that under the first 
execution issued on the Clark, Eldredge & Co judgment 
the marshal levied on and sold two parcels of said lot 2. 
one of which lies on the east side of the alley and the 
other near the center of that portion situate on the west 
side 
Now, if Lydia Y Merrill, the cotenant of the plain-
tiff, or those claiming under her, should commence suit 
for partition, it would be found impracticable to make 
such a division of the property as she or they would be 
entitled to without ignoring one or the other of these 
sales The court called upon to make partition would be 
constrained to ignore such sales, or at least one of them 
Moreover, at the tune the last sale was made under the 
executions [**171] mentioned, the [***24] balance re-
maining unpaid on the Clark, Eldredge & Co judgment 
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amounted to $ 25 57, and no more, yet the officer levied 
upon and sold property of Young to satisfy an alleged 
balance of $ 136. and, after deductmg his fees, expenses, 
and commissions therefrom, paid the balance, $ 106, to 
Stephens & Schroeder, who retamed the same ever after 
This was not an irregularity merely, such as would ren-
der the sale voidable, but, the levy and sale being exces-
sive, the sale was absolutely void Ghdden v Chase, 56 
Am Dec 690 Patterson v Corneal, 13 Am Dec 208. 
Hastings v Johnson, 1 Nev 613 
It will be observed that the purchasers at all the exe-
cution sales complamed of except the first were the at-
torneys for the judgment creditor, that to the extent of 
furnishing the officer with the descriptions of the prop-
erty to be levied on and sold by him under the execu-
tions, they directed and controlled the processes of the 
court, and directed and required the officer to levy upon 
and sell the property in such parcels as rendered it im-
possible to realize at the sales a fair price therefor [HN5] 
A purchase [**256] by an attorney for his own benefit 
at a sale over which [*"x**25] he has exercised any direc-
tion or control should always be closely scrutinized by 
the court In Jones v Martin, 80 Am Dec 641, speakmg 
of such purchases, the court says "Public policy and the 
analogies of the law require that they should be consid-
ered per se as m the twilight between legal fraud and 
fairness, and should be deemed fraudulent, or m trust for 
the debtor, upon slight additional facts " See Howell v 
5tffer,4Johns Ch 117, Byersv Surget, 60 US 303, 19 
HOW303, 15 L Ed 670 And where, as m this case, the 
attorneys, who became purchasers, have so directed and 
controlled the officer charged with the duty of executmg 
the writ as to lead to a sacrifice of the debtor's property, 
the court will not hesitate to grant relief 
[y172] It is contended by the appellants that relief 
cannot be granted m this case, because the statutory pe-
riod for redemption had expired before this suit was 
brought The cases are by no means rare where a court of 
equity has interfered to set aside a sale after the time for 
redemption has expired, such sale having been attended 
by irregularities and havmg resulted m a gross sacrifice 
of the judgmenj [vr'w26] debtor's property Morris v 
Robe)>, 73*111 462, Blight's Heirs v Tobin. 18 Am Dec 
219. Bullen v Dawson (III Sup), 139 III 633, 29 NE 
1038, Graffam J Burgess, 111 US 180, 6S Ct 686, 29 
L Ed 839 We may add that it appears from the record 
that the plaintiff was assured by Mr Stephens, before the 
period for redemption had expired, that the statutory pe-
riod would not be msisted upon, and it comes with bad 
grace from the defendant now to urge that the plaintiff 
should be estopped by the fact that he relied upon that 
promise It is true that this assurance was given, not by 
defendant Schroeder, but by his partner, Stephens They, 
however, were acting m concert engaged m a jomt ven-
ture, and all the acts and declarations of Stephens in con-
nection with the sales and purchases m question were, 
under the circumstances disclosed by this record, binding 
upon the defendant Schroeder Blight's Heirs v Tobin* 
18 Am Dec 219 
of the appellants, 
which would call 
the court below 
We have made a careful examination of the record m 
connection with ipe numerous errors assigned on the part 
and have been unable to find any error 
for a reversal of the decree [^^21] of 
[The fact that there was a gross sacrifice 
of the judgment debtor's property at these sales is proved 
beyond controversy In the same manner it is established 
that these sales were attended by many and serious ir-
regularities, for which the parties claiming through these 
sales were directly responsible Where such facts are 
clearly established by the evidence, and a decree is pro-
nounced [*173] 
basis, it will not 
errors m the trial 
appealed from be 
permitting redemption on an equitable 
be disturbed because of any technical 
of the case Let the order and decree 
affirmed 
MINER and ^MITH, JJ , concur 
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PRIOR HISTORY: APPEAL FROM THE SU-
PREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY OF UTAH. 
THIS was a complaint in the nature of a bill in eq-
uity, originally filed in the Third Judicial District Court 
of the Territory of Utah, by John M. Young against 
Frank E. Stephens and wife and Albert T. Schroeder and 
wife, as defendants, to set aside and cancel certain execu-
tion sales of real property in Salt Lake City as fraudulent 
and void, and for permission to redeem from such sales, 
notwithstanding the expiration of the statutory time for 
redemption, and for a decree compelling the defendants 
to convey to the plaintiff the property mentioned, upon 
just and equitable terms. 
The material facts in the case were that, on March 6, 
1891, Clark, Eldredge & Co., a corporation, obtained 
judgment by default in said court against the appellee 
John M. Young, Henry Goddard, and George Goddard in 
the sum of $1673.36, with $30.60 costs. Frank B. 
Stephens and Albert T. Schroeder, partners and the prin-
cipal defendants, were the attorneys for Clark, Eldredge 
& Co. in such action. The plaintiff John M. Young was 
the owner of the undivided one half of two parcels of 
land in Salt Lake City, and plaintiffs sister, Lydia Y. 
Merrill, was the owner of the other undivided one half of 
the said parcels. Their title was derived from the will of 
their father, and, as to the greater part of such property, 
was subject to a right in Sarah Milton Young and Ann 
Olive Young to receive each one fourth of the money 
arising from said property during their respective lives. 
On April 29|, 1881, an execution was issued in said 
action of Clark, Eldredge & Co. against John M. Young, 
directing the marshal of the United States, if sufficient 
personal property could not be found to satisfy the judg-
ment, to levy upon the real estate belonging to Young 
and his codefendpnts in such action; and on May 7, 1891, 
notice that he attached and levied on all 
aim, and interest of the said John M. 
Young and his cddefendants in and to that parcel of land 
described as beginning 101 feet north, and 39 1/2 feet 
east of the S.W. Lorner of lot 2, block 70, plat "A," Salt 
Lake City survey, and running thence east 15 1/2 feet, 
the marshal gave 
the right, title, c| 
thence north 28 feet, thence west 15 1/2 feet, thence 
south 28 feet to the place of beginning; and also on that 
part of the same lot described as beginning 32 1/2 feet 
west from the S.E. corner of the said lot, running thence 
west 38 feet, thence north 98 1/3 feet, thence east 38 feet, 
thence south 98 1/3 feet to the place of beginning; and 
also on a part of (lot 12, block 8, five acre plat "A," Big 
Field survey. 
on 
the 
Afterwards, 
that he had sold 
John Clark, andj 
penses of sale, p; 
viz., $962.36, to 
and further retailed 
on said judgment] 
mentioned in the 
stockholder of C. 
July 28, an alias 
such action for 
July 25, 1891, the marshal certified 
jthe property described in the notice to 
deducting his commissions and ex-
id the balance realized upon said sale, 
attorneys of Clark, Eldredge & Co., 
that there was still due and unpaid 
the sum of $886.90. The John Clark 
[return was a director and the principal 
ark, Eldredge & Co. Afterwards, on 
Execution issued from the said court in 
full sum of $1673.36, and $30.50 the 
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costs, by virtue of which the marshal levied upon a cer-
tain other parcel of the same lot described as beginning 
64 1/2 feet west of the N.E. corner of said lot 2, running 
thence west 45 1/2 feet, thence south 20 rods, thence east 
78 1/2 feet, thence north 90 3/4 feet, thence east 31 1/4 
feet, thence north 41 1/4 feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet, 
thence north 148 1/2 feet, thence west 48 feet, thence 
north 49 1/2 feet to the place of beginning; and on Au-
gust 25 the marshal returned that he had sold these prem-
ises to the defendants Stephens and Schroeder for the 
sum of $828.70, and further certified that the judgment 
obtained by said corporation was still unsatisfied to the 
extent of $100. 
On September 30, said marshal made a further re-
turn to the last mentioned writ, in which he certified that 
he sold all of lot 12, block 8, five acre plat "A,n Big Field 
survey, situate in Salt Lake County, and also a certain 
parcel of land described as beginning 39 feet east and 81 
feet north of the S.W. corner of said lot 2, running thence 
north 209 feet, thence east 16 1/2 feet, thence south 209 
feet, thence west 16 1/2 feet to the place of beginning, to 
Stephens and Schroeder for the sum of $136, and that, 
deducting the costs and expenses of said last levy, 
amounting to $30, paid the balance, $106, to the attor-
neys of Clark, Eldredge & Co., and returned said writ 
fully satisfied. 
The court found that all that part of lot 2 as de-
scribed in this statement a plat of which appeared in the 
record^-constituted a single-parcel-of land,-and should 
have been regarded and treated as such, and not as being 
divided into separate lots or parcels, and that the first 
parcel sold being 15 1/2 by 28 feet had no ingress or 
egress, and that the same as sold would necessarily be 
sacrificed on such sale on account of its location, but that 
at the time of the sale of this parcel, neither Stephens nor 
Schroeder had actual knowledge of any other realty 
owned by plaintiff. 
The other material facts are stated in the opinion of 
the court. 
Before the case was called for argument, the suit 
was settled so far as the defendants Stephens and his 
wife were concerned, leaving Schroeder and his wife 
sole defendants. The case coming on to be heard upon 
pleadings and proofs, the District Court made a decree 
permitting the plaintiff Young to redeem the property 
upon paying to the defendants the sum of $723.25, less 
certain costs, but subject to one half of a mortgage exe-
cuted by the defendants, who were ordered to execute 
and deliver to plaintiff a deed of the property. From this 
decree an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court of the 
Territory, which affirmed the decree of the District 
Court, whereupon appellants prayed and were allowed an 
appeal to this court. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Defendant attorney chal-
lenged a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Territory 
of Utah, which affirmed a decision setting aside execu-
tion sales as fraudulent and granting plaintiff debtor 
permission to redeem the property7 sold at execution. 
OVERVIEW: A default judgment was entered against 
the debtor and the creditor's attorneys caused the marshal 
to make three separate sales of the debtor's land to them. 
The debtor brought suit against the attorneys seeking a 
decree setting the sales aside and permitting him to re-
deem the property. The trial court found that the marshal 
and attorney were the only ones present at the execution 
sales, that successive sales had produced lower prices, 
that one of the attorneys determined that a balance would 
be left on the judgment after each sale so that all of the 
debtor's land would be sold, and that the debtor had of-
fered to pay the attorneys the full amount of the judg-
ment and additional compensation but the offer was re-
fused. One attorney settled before trial but the remaining 
attorney challenged the decree of redemption on the ba-
sis that it was entered after the expiration of the statutory 
redemption period. The court affirmed because the attor-
neys' inequitable conduct justified rescission of the exe-
cution sales and equity had jurisdiction to grant relief 
from-fraudHBOtwkhstanding -the -expiration of the statu-
tory period. 
OUTCOME: The court affirmed the judgment setting 
aside the sales made to the attorney and granting the 
debtor permission to redeem the property. 
CORE TERMS: redeem, purchaser, redemption, statu-
tory period, bidder, deed, expired, levy, realized, mar-
shal's, inadequacy of price, sale of property, judgment 
creditors, irregularity, sacrificed, assurance, ignorant, 
forms of law, judgment debtor, statutory time, reconvey-
ance, thereunder, fraudulent, equitable, collector, at-
tended, quantity, insisted, grossly, lulled 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution 
[HN1] While mere inadequacy of price has rarely been 
held sufficient in itself to justify setting aside a judicial 
sale of property, courts are not slow to seize upon other 
circumstances impeaching the fairness of the transaction, 
as a cause for vacating it, especially if the inadequacy be 
161 US 334, *, 16 S Ct 512,**, 
40 L Ed 721, ***, 1896 U S LEXIS 2|67 
Page 3 
so gross as to shock the conscience If the sale has been 
attended by any irregularity, as if several lots have been 
sold in bulk where they should have been sold sepa-
rately, or sold in such manner that their full value could 
not be realized, if bidders have been kept away, if any 
undue advantage has been taken to the prejudice of the 
owner of the property, or he has been lulled mto a false 
security or, if the sale has been collusivel>, or m any 
other manner, conducted for the benefit of the purchaser, 
and the property has been sold at a greatly madequate 
price, the sale may be set aside, and the owner permitted 
to redeem 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution 
[HN2] If, m addition to madequacy of price there be 
other circumstances throwing a shadow upon the fairness 
of the transaction, the judgment debtor will be allowed to 
redeem 
Civil Procedure > Judgments > Entry of Judgments > 
Enforcement & Execution > Writs of Execution 
Legal Ethics > Professional Conduct > Illegal Conduct 
[HN3] Although there is no general rule that an attorney 
may not purchase at an execution sale, provided it be not 
done to the prejudice of his own clients, such purchase m 
itself is calculated to throw a doubt upon the fairness of 
the sale, and public pohcy and the analogies of law re-
quire that such purchases should be considered per se as 
m the twilight between legal fraud and fairness, and 
should be deemed fraudulent, or in trust for the debtor, 
upon slight additional facts 
Civil Procedure > Pleading & Practice > Defenses, 
Demurrers & Objections > Affirmative Defenses > 
General Overview 
Contracts Law > Secured Transactions > Default > 
Foreclosure & Repossession > Redemption 
[HN4] A purchaser is estopped to insist upon the statu-
tory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not m 
writing and were made without consideration, upon the 
ground that the debtor was lulled mto a false security 
LAWYERS' EDITION HEADNOTES: 
When judicial sales may be canceled for fraud ~ 
purchase by attorneys ~ suit m equity to annul sale -
Headnote 
1 Execution sales of real property, made for grossly 
madequate prices, may be canceled where the property 
was purchased by one of the plaintiff s attorneys, and the 
made sales were 
property by 
the least possih 
sale so as to sell 
were made 
was the sole 
sent except the 
where an offer 
more than was 
m pursuance of a plan to obtam the 
successive sales of different parts thereof for 
e sum, leavmg a balance due after each 
all the debtor's property, and the levies 
unddr specific directions of the attorney, who 
biader at the sales and the only person pre-
officer conductmg the sales, especially 
to redeem the property by payment of 
has been refused due: 
2 One of a 
terest m the property 
sales, fraudulently 
title thereby acquired 
partner's acts m 
{firm of attorneys who has acquired an m-
under a purchase on execution 
made by his partner, cannot set up the 
and at the same time repudiate his 
t[he acquisition thereof 
3 The 
tion from a sale 
suit in equity to 
because of the 
who purchased 
mto false security 
irrespective of 
writing and were| 
expnjation of the statutory period for redemp-
of land under execution does not bar a 
[annul the sale and a deed made thereon, 
fraudulent conduct of plaintiffs attorneys, 
the sale, where they lulled the debtor 
by assurances of permission to redeem 
statute, although these were not m 
made without consideration 
4t 
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more than sufficient to satisfy the amount actually due, 
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and payment of the excess to plaintiffs attorneys will not 
invalidate the entire proceedings'? 
Whether the lev} upon the interest of a co-tenant in 
a specific part, designated by metes and bounds, of a 
certain larger quantity of land is valid, is not decided 
Before the time had expired to redeem from the exe-
cution sale the plaintiff was told by the defendant that he 
would not be pushed, that the statutory tune to redeem 
would not be insisted upon and, believing it, acted and 
relied upon such assurance Held, that under such cir-
cumstances the purchaser was estopped to msist upon the 
statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances were not 
m writing and were made without consideration, and that 
there was a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity. 
founded upon its general right to relieve from the conse-
quences of fraud, accident or mistake, which might be 
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for re-
demption has expired 
COUNSEL: Mr A T Schroeder and Mr James B Ed-
monds for appellants 
Mr Parley L Williams for appellee 
OPINION BY: BROWN 
OPINION 
[-331] [±*513] [-W*724J. JMEL JUSTICE 
BROWN, after stating the case, delivered the opmion of 
the court 
Plaintiff relies mainly for a decree in this case upon 
the fact that his mterest m the property in question, 
which the trial court found to be worth $ 26,000, was 
sacrificed at these several judicial sales to pay a judg-
ment of little more than $ 1700 
[HN1] While mere madequacy of price has rarely 
been held sufficient [*"338] in itself to justify setting 
aside a judicial sale of property, courts are not slow to 
seize upon other circumstances impeaching the fairness 
of the transaction, as a cause for vacating it, especially if 
the madequacy be so gross as to shock the conscience If 
the sale has been attended by any irregularity, as if sev-
eral lots have been sold in bulk where they should have 
been sold separately, or sold in such manner that their 
full value could not be realized, if bidders have been kept 
away, if any undue advantage has been taken to the 
prejudice of the owner of the property, or he has been 
lulled mto a false security, or, if the sale has been collu-
sively, or in any other manner, conducted for the benefit 
of the purchaser, and the property has been sold at a 
[**514] greatly madequate price, the sale may be set 
aside, and the owner permitted to redeem 
Thus, m Byers v Surget 19 How 303, 306, lands to 
the amount of 14,000 acres, and estimated at from $ 
40,000 to $ 70,000 in value, were sold by the sheriff m 
satisfaction of a judgment for costs of $ 39, to the attor-
ney for the successful party, and conveyed to him for $ 
9 31 1/2 The sale was pronounced to have been fraudu-
lent and void and a reconveyance of the property was 
decreed It appeared that the owner of the property had 
no knowledge of the suit until he was informed of the 
sale of the land, that the attorney for the successful party, 
the defendant, assumed himself the power to tax the 
costs, the right of selecting the final process, of prescrib-
ing the description and quantity of the property ^hich he 
chose to have seized m satisfaction of directing the sher-
iff as to the various steps to be taken by him and of be-
coming the purchaser himself for the petty sum of $ 9 31 
1/2 Of this proceeding, Mr Justice Darnel, m deliver-
ing the opinion of the court, remarks "Such is the history 
of a transaction which the appellant asks of this court to 
sanction, and it seems pertinent here to inquire under 
what system of civilpolity, under what code of law or 
ethics, a transaction like that disclosed by the record m 
this case can be excused, or even palliated " 
In Graffam v Burgess 117 US 180, 186, two 
judgment [^339] creditors became the purchasers for 
about $ 150 of unincumbered property worth at least $ 
10,000, although the judgment debtor had $ 3000 worth 
of furniture and personal property m the house subject to 
levyJDunng the temporary absence of the complainant, 
the defendants entered upon the premises, broke mto the 
house and took possession of it on behalf of the purchas-
ers, removed the furniture and other personal property, 
including the wearing apparel of the complainant, took 
possession of her personal correspondence and papers 
and the sum of $ 170 in money, and still retamed posses-
sion of the property at the time of the filing of the bill 
The court found that the complainant was ignorant of the 
issue of the execution or of the sale of the property, that 
the purchasers knew that she was unconscious of it, and 
endeavoured to keep her so, and took an inequitable 
[^^HS] advantage of her ignorance to get possession 
of it In reply to the argument that the proceedmgs were 
regular, Mr Justice Bradley observed "It is insisted that 
the proceedmgs were all conducted according to the 
forms of law Very likely Some of the most atrocious 
frauds are committed m that way Indeed, the greater the 
fraud intended, the more particular the parties to it often 
are to proceed according to the strictest forms of law " 
The court commented most severely upon the conduct of 
the purchasers, and found no difficulty m setting aside 
the sale, although four members of the court dissented 
upon the ground that the complamant had failed m her 
duty to redeem from the sale withm the time limited by 
law 
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In Howell v. Baker, 4 Johns. Ch. 118, a farm worth 
$ 2000 was sold under a judgment and execution, on 
which not more than $ 80 were due, to the attorney of the 
plaintiff, who attended the sheriffs sale, for $ 10. The 
sale was held upon a stormy day, when no person but the 
attorney and the deputy sheriff were present, and it was 
held that these facts, connected with the g*oss inade-
quacy of price, were sufficient to authorize the purchaser 
to be held as trustee for the respective interests of the 
parties to the execution, and the bidder was allowed to 
redeem on equitable terms. A large number of other 
cases are also cited by Mr. Justice Bradley in his [*340] 
opinion in Graffam v. Burgess, and the general proposi-
tion laid down, as above stated, that [HN2] if, in addition 
to inadequacy of price there be other circumstances 
throwing a shadow upon the fairness of the transaction, 
the judgment debtor will be allowed to redeem. 
There are other facts in this case than the grossly in-
adequate price realized for this property, that afford am-
ple justification for the action of the court below in per-
mitting the plaintiff to redeem upon equitable terms, and 
ordering a reconveyance of the property. 
1. The property was sold to Stephens and Schroe-
der, who had acted as attorneys for the judgment creditor 
throughout the entire transaction, and had been fully paid 
by the corporation for their services. In this connection 
the trial court further found that Stephens furnished the 
officer a description of the property to be levied upon 
and sold, and that he accordingly did levy upon and sell 
as he was directed by Stephens according to such de-
scription. Add to this the further finding that at neither 
of the sales was there any other bidder and no other per-
son present than Stephens and the officer conducting the 
sales, and we can readily appreciate how inevitable it 
was that the property should be sacrificed. [HNS] Al-
though there is no general rule that an attorney may not 
purchase at an execution sale, provided it be not done to 
the prejudice of his own clients, Pacific Railroad v. 
Ketchum, 101 U.S. 289, 300, such purchase in itself is 
calculated to throw a doubt upon the fairness of the sale, 
and as is quaintly said of such sales by the Court of Ap-
peals of Kentucky in Howell v. McCreery, 7 Dana, 388: 
"Public policy and the analogies of law require that they 
should be considered per se as in the twilight between 
legal fraud and fairness, and should be deemed fraudu-
lent, or in trust for the debtor, upon slight additional 
facts." See also Hall v. Hallet, 1 Cox, 134; Jones v. Mar-
tin, 26 Texas, 57; Byers v. Surget, 19 How. 303; Blight's 
Heirs v. Tobin, 7 T.B. Mon. 612. 
2. The alias execution of July 28 was not only is-
sued for the full amount of the original judgment, $ 
1673.36 and $30.50 costs, without [**515] deducting $ 
962.36, realized upon the first execution, [*341] but 
under it the marshal sold, under the directions of 
Stephens and Sbhroeder, property for an amount in ex-
cess of the amount remaining unpaid on the judgment, 
and collected the excess and paid it over to Stephens and 
Schroeder, who retained it. In this connection the trial 
court made the following finding: "At the time of the last 
sale, to wit, September 30, 1891, there was a balance due 
Clark, Eldredge & Co. of only $ 25.57, and their judg-
ment had been satisfied except said sum, and to satisfy 
said balance property was sold as aforesaid, amounting 
in all to $ 136, $ 106 of which was paid by the United 
States marshal jo said Stephens and Schroeder." Upon 
the theory were the judgment creditors entitled to any 
more than the amount of their claim, and if, as may 
sometimes happen, the property be sold for more than 
the amount of the execution, the residue should be re-
turned to the judgment debtor. 
There is reason for saying that the issue of an alias 
execution for thi original amount of the judgment, after 
the return of a prior execution, satisfied to the amount of 
nearly one half of such judgment, the sale of property 
thereunder to an amount more than sufficient to satisfy 
the amount actually due, and the payment of the excess 
to the plaintiffs attorneys, invalidate the entire proceed-
ings - the rule in some States being that a levy for an 
amount exceeding the amount of the judgment or the 
amount actually due upon the judgment with interest and 
costs is void. 2 Freeman on Executions, § 381; Glidden 
v. Chase, 35 Maine, 90; Pickett v. Breckinridge, 22 Pick. 
297; Peck v. Tiffany, 2 N.Y. 451; Hastings v. Johnson, 1 
Nevada, 613; Patterson v. Corneal, 3 A. K. Marsh. 618. 
But, however this may be, there can be no doubt that this 
alias execution and the proceedings thereunder were ir-
regular so far as Stephens and Schroeder were con-
cerned, though perhaps not to the extent of invalidating 
the title of a bona fide purchaser. Stead's Executors v. 
Course, 4 Cranch, 403; French v. Edwards, 13 Wall 
506; Groffv. Joi\es, 6 Wend. 522; Tiernan v. Wilson, 6 
Johns. Ch. 411. 
The couft below was also of opinion that the 
property of the qebtor was sacrificed by the manner in 
342] were made, and particularly by 
^s of his interest in different parts of lot 
in common with his sister, Lydia Y. 
proper regard for his interests required 
which the sales 
the successive sal 
2, block 70, held 
Merrill, and that a 
that his entire right to the whole land thus held in com-
mon should have 
raises a question 
tirely in harmony. 
view of the other 
do not feel calledl 
point. 
been sold at one time. This, however, 
|as to which the authorities are not en-
viz., whether the levy upon the interest 
of a co-tenant in & specific part, designated by metes and 
bounds, of a certain larger quantity of land is valid. In 
[***726] manifest irregularities, we 
upon to express an opinion upon this 
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There is one finding, however, in respect to these 
sales, which, taken in connection with the facts that the 
defendants were the attorneys for the judgment creditors, 
furnished the officer selling the property with the de-
scription of the property to be levied upon and sold, and 
became the purchasers of the property either directly 
-from the marshal, or indirectly through their client Clark, 
which is in itself sufficient to justify the action of the 
court below in vacating the sales and permitting the 
plaintiff to redeem, viz., that "before any of said property 
was sold, said Stephens, who was the sole bidder at each 
of said sales, formed the intention that, regardless of the 
value of the various pieces of property to be sold, and 
that were sold, he would leave a balance after each sale, 
so that all of the plaintiffs property would be sold, and 
he so bid at the various sales as to accomplish, and did 
accomplish, said object and purpose." As Stephens was 
appellant's partner in the practice of law, and in the 
prosecution of the claim of Clark, Eldredge & Co., and 
bought the property in for himself and partner, who now 
sets up title in himself by virtue of such purchase, it is 
clear that he is bound by Stephens' acts and representa-
tions. Certainly he cannot set up a title acquired by 
Stephens' assistance, and at the same time repudiate his 
acts in connection with the acquisition of such title. 
There are other circumstances, also, found by the 
court below, which, taken in connection with the grossly 
inadequate price paid, render it still more inequitable that 
purchasers standing in_ the position of tiie defendants in 
this case [*343] should insist upon the letter of the bar-
gain, and throw something more than a mere doubt upon 
the fairness of the transaction. Before the time had ex-
pired for redemption Stephens and Schroeder requested 
the collector of taxes of that county to allow them to 
bring suit against the plaintiff to recover the taxes owing 
by him for the year 1890, on the part of lot 2 described in 
the complaint, and agreed that, if the collector so con-
sented, they would bring the suit, and make the collec-
tion free of cost to the collector, an arrangement which 
was carried out according to its terms. On April 10, 
1892, plaintiff offered to pay defendants the full amount 
of the judgment obtained by them, together with interest 
at the rate of one per cent per month, and also to liberally 
compensate them for all their services and trouble, give 
them $ 1000 besides as a bonus, and pay all their ad-
vances with interest if they would reconvey to him, 
which the defendants refused to do. Of a similar offer 
and refusal this court in 19 How. 310, 311, speaking 
through Mr. Justice Daniel, said: "Another pregnant 
proof of the design of the appellant to grasp and retain 
what no principle of liberality or equity could warrant, is 
the fact, clearly established, of his refusal after the sale to 
accept from the appellee, for the redemption of his lands 
so glaringly sacrificed, a sum of money considerably 
exceeding in amount the judgment for costs, with all the 
[**516] expenses incidental to the carrying that judg-
ment into effect. The appellant, by his irregular and un-
conscientious contrivances, achieved what he conceived 
to be an immense speculation, and he determined to avail 
himself of it, regardless of its injustice and ruinous con-
sequences to the appellee." 
About the same time, the plaintiff, being ignorant of 
the fact that lot 12 had been sold and that the defendants 
had a deed therefor, informed the defendant Schroeder 
that he intended to redeem the lot from a sale that had 
been made for the taxes of 1891, and afterwards did so 
redeem said lot, and informed Schroeder that it had been 
done, the plaintiff being still ignorant that the defendants 
held a marshal's deed for it. Again, on April 24, plaintiff 
being still ignorant that defendants held a marshal's deed 
for lot 12, informed Schroeder [*344] that he intended 
to redeem said lot from a tax sale that had been made 
thereof for the taxes of 1890, and did subsequently re-
deem the same, and informed Schroeder of the fact, and 
that Schroeder never at any time informed him that he 
had obtained a deed for the lot. The court further found 
that defendants purposely and intentionally failed to in-
form the plaintiff that had a title to the said lot at the time 
the plaintiff was redeeming the same from the tax sales. 
The court further found that the said attorneys, in viola-
tion of their duty to obtain the highest possible price for 
the property while acting in behalf of their clients, be-
came the bidders upon said property, and so acted as to 
obtain^ the same^for the leastjpossible sum^sojis to sat-
isfy the judgment, and at the same time to sell all the 
property belonging to said Young. If these facts be not 
sufficient to justify a rescission of these sales, it is diffi-
cult to imagine what would be so considered. 
4. Defendant relies mainly upon the fact that the 
statutory period of redemption was allowed to expire 
before this bill was filed, but the court below found in 
this connection that before the time had expired to re-
deem the property, the plaintiff was told by the defendant 
Stephens that he would not be pushed, that the statutory 
time to redeem would not be insisted upon, and that the 
plaintiff believed and relied upon such assurance. Under 
such circumstances the courts have held with great una-
nimity that the [HN4] purchaser is estopped to insist 
upon the statutory period, notwithstanding the assurances 
were not in writing and were made without considera-
tion, upon the ground that the debtor was lulled into a 
false security. Guinn v. Locke, 1 Head, 110; Combs v. 
Little, 4 NJ. Eq. 310: Griffin v. Coffey, 9 B Mon 452; 
Martin v. Martin, 16 B. Mon. 8; Butt v. Butt, 91 Indiana, 
305; Turner v. King, 2 Ired. Eq. 132; Lucas v Nichols, 
66 Illinois, 41; McMakin v Schenck, 98 Indiana, 264. In 
Southard v. Pope's Ex'rs, 9 B Mon. 261, 264, it is said 
that "a refusal by the purchaser to accept the money and 
permit the redemption to be made within the time agreed 
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would be a fraud upon the defendant in execution, and 
authorize an application by him to a court of equity for 
relief" 
[^345] Probably, if a motion had been made m the 
original case to set aside the sale upon the ground of 
mere irregularities, such motion would have to be made 
before the statutory period for redemption had passed, 
but in this class of cases, where fraudulent conduct is 
imputed to the parties conductmg the sale, there 
[y^727] is a concurrent jurisdiction of a court of equity, 
founded upon its general right to relieve from the conse-
quences of fraud, accident or mistake, which may be 
exercised, notwithstanding the statutory period for re-
demption has expired. It is evident that, where a sale has 
culminated m the execution and delivery of a deed to the 
purchaser, which is not void upon its face, or a mortgage 
has been put upon the property, as m this case, no rem-
edy is complete, which does not go to the cancellation of 
such deed, and the complete reinvestment of the title m 
the plaintiff It also appears from the findings that appel-
lant has received rents from the property, that various 
sums had been expended for taxes and other purposes, 
that an accounting was necessary m adjustmg the rights 
of the parties, vVhich could not be effectually carried on 
m a court of law There can be no doubt of the jurisdic-
tion of a court of equity in such case notwithstanding the 
expiration of the statutory time of redemption Graff am 
v Burgess, 117\US 180, Blight's Heirs v Tobin, 7TB 
Mon 612, Day y Graham, 1 Gilman. (6 111) 435, Morris 
v Robey, 73 Illinois, 462, Fergus v Woodworth, 44 Illi-
nois, 374, Bull en v Dawson, 139 Illinois, 633, Jenkins v 
Memweather, 109 Illinois, 647, State Bank v Noland, 
13 Arkansas, 29y 
The appellant's brief deals largely with criticisms 
upon the findings and upon the admission of testimony, 
which we do not feel it necessary to discuss, as they do 
pents of the case, which rest upon the 
It would be a reproach to a court of 
d not lay hold of such a transaction as 
be, and set aside a sale of property ac-
forms of law and in defiance of natural 
not mvolve the 
undisputed facts] 
equity, if it con 
this is shown to 
quired under the 
justice 
The decree cj>f the court below is, therefore, 
Affirmed 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT KANCI COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY. STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID PURER, 
?isint:x:, 
\ s fcASE NO, 07 6 0 01S1 MI 
JUSTIN C. BOND, ALISON D. BOND.) BENCH TRIAL 
and DALE M. DORIUS, ) 
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BEFORE THE HONORABLE DAVID L. MOWER 
SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT MANTI COURT 
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efe-6A. 
1 II contact Mr. Pyper. 
2 II Q. (BY MR. QUESENBERRY) : Correct. Correct 
3 || THE WITNESS: I -- I don't recall exactly how that, 
4 || ah, contact come about. 
5 || Q. Do you recall seeing him in person? 
6 || A. I may have. 
7 || Q. Okay. 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q. What do you recall during that first communication? 
A. Ah, I don't recall exactly what transpired. I think 
he expressed his frustration and wanted information on how to 
redeem the property prior to the expiration of the redemption 
period. 
Q. And how did you respond? 
A. I told him that he needed to contact the plaintiff's 
attorney in the action and get a payoff or find out what he 
needed to do to redeem it. 
Q. How did he specifically express frustration to you? 
THE COURT: You're asking him to repeat what Mr. 
Pyper said; right? j 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Correct, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Can you do that? 
THE WITNESS: I can't pervade and I -- I --
Q. (BY MR. QUESENBERRY): Did you recall any emotions or 
any other indications, ah, giving you this idea of 
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frustration? 
THE WITNESS: Well, he -- hie was anxious to get it 
redeemed, you know. And I -- I -- bejyond that, I don't know. 
I don't recall. 
Q. Do you have any other recollection, ah, in any of 
the three communications that you had with Mr. Pyper? 
A. Well, I remember a phone call conversation, and it 
was -- the phone call was made from I' believe it was D-Land 
Title and it -- it was shortly before the redemption period 
expired. Only days. And -- and he, 'ah, expressed concern 
that they were unable to get a payoff so that they could 
redeem the property. 
Q. Do you remember, was that a conference call from 
D-Land Title? Or was it just you --
A. No. As I recall, --
Q. -- and he? 
A. - ah, Mr. Pyper was at D-Land Title. 
Q. Okay. 
Do you remember anything else of that conversation, 
that phone conversation from D-Land? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. But you -- you do recall thfrt being prior to the ex-
-- ah, expiration of did you say the ^redemption period? 
A. Redemption period. Yes, it was. 
Q. Do you have any other recollections of the three 
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(Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 3 
was received into evidence.) 
FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. QUESENBERRY: 
Q. Mr. Pyper, ah, would you turn to the second page. 
THE COURT: Well, it says what it says. I don't 
need a witness to read it to me. 
Q. (EY MR. QUESENBERRY): Okay. 
Mr. Pyper, is the property -- ah, was it encumbered 
with anything during that 6-month, ah, redemption period? 
Q. 
A. 
there wa 
Q. 
1 A' 
Q. 
1 A. 
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What was it encumbered with? 
Ah, Justin Bond had a couple of liens on it. Ah, 
four or five different -- different liens. 
Were you able to clear title? 
Yes. Everything, except for, ah, Justin Bond. 
His judgment, which is at issue here today? 
Correct. 
Nowf chere was talk about a, ah - - a large bank lien 
le property. Do you know what that was about? 
That was part of the original mortgage when I built 
back in '96, and it was paid down to 3 0 -- about 
Then we, ah, settled with the bank. 
Has that deed been reconveyed off of title? 
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1 A. Yes. 
2 MR. QUESENBERRY: Your Honoij:, if I may approach. 
3 THE COURT: Go ahead. 
4 Q. (BY MR. QUESENBERRY) : Do yoiji recognize that document 
5 (Indicated)? 
6 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
7 Q. And what is it? 
8 THE COURT: Does it have an exhibit number on it? 
9 MR. QUESENBERRY: I believe -- No. 4, Your Honor. 
10 THE COURT: I'm asking the jvitness. 
11 THE WITNESS: Exhibit -- ye$. No. 4. 
12 THE COURT: Thank you. 
13 And the question was do you recognize? 
14 THE WITNESS: Yes. 
15 Q. (BY MR. QUESENBERRY) : And w)iat is it 
16 THE WITNESS: Ah, the deed bf reconveyance from 
17 Wells Fargo Bank. 
18 Q. That you received from Well|s — Wells Fargo? 
19 A. Yes. 
2 0 MR. QUESENBERRY: Your Hono|r, I'd move that this 
21 exhibit be admitted as evidence. 
22 THE COURT: Mz. Reyes? (No| verbal response.) 
23 Have you seen the exhibit, iMz. Reyes? 
24 MZ. REYES: Your Honor, if I could just voir dire 
25 Mr. Pyper on this issue quickly. 
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THE COURT: Oh. 
MZ. REYES: I'm not asking him to disclose. I'm 
just asking him if anyone assisted him in it. 
THE COURT: Overruled. Go ahead and answer. 
THE WITNESS: Ah, yes. 
Q. (BY MZ. REYES): And who was that? 
THE WITNESS: Ah, my attorney Bryan Quesenberry. 
Q. That's the same person that's here with you today; 
is that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. 
And -- and when was this deed of reconveyance 
executed? 
You mean when did I -• 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
the she 
against 
A. 
still -
right. 
Well, when 
Ah, 
So 
riff ' s 
the p 
Yes 
MZ. 
THE 
- you': 
MR. 
this is 
on - - on 
is it signed? What is 
dated the 23rd day of 
November 9th 
sale the, ah 
roperty 
REYES: 
COURT: 
re offer 
trust de 
at that time; 
Okay. 
Back 
ing Nc 
QUESENBERRY: 
She wanted to voir 
to you, 
). 4? 
Ah, yes 
during --
ted would 
correct? 
it dated? 
April, 2007. 
- at the time 
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THE COURT: What about No. 4? Should I receive it? 
MZ. REYES: It's fine. 
THE COURT: Received. 
(PLAINTIFF'S EXHIBIT NO. 4 
was received into evidence].) 
Next question, Mr. Ouesenberry. 
FURTHER DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. QUESENBERRY: 
Q. What did you plan to do abbut the property after the 
sheriff's sale, November of '06? 
A. Ah, to fix it up so it was that we could get the 
appraisal for the bank. We started tight away qualifying for 
the bank loan and, ah, then to --
THE COURT: I think I'm getting more than I wanted 
here . 
"I was 
Q. 
Q. 
A. 
done tt 
Q. 
A. 
The question's "What were you gonna do?" And he said, 
gonna fix it up." So let's g6 on to the next question. 
(BY MR. QUESENBERRY): Okay, 
Did you apply for a bank lcpan? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
And with what bank? Do yoiji recall? 
I can't recall the name of the bank. Ah, it was 
trough, ah, Mike and Chris right here in -- in Ephraim. 
That's fine. That -- that 1s not important. 
Did you do that within, ah, 180 days after? 
Yes. 
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Q. Were you able to, ah - - to redeem the property from 
the sheriff's sale within that 180 days. 
A. No. 
Q. Why not? 
A. I could not get a payoff that the bank requested, 
ah, from Dorius/Bond. 
Q. Okay. 
What efforts did you make to obtain that payoff 
amount? 
A. I made several phone calls. 
0. Now, are you looking at an exhibit? 
A. Yes. 
Q. I believe we already admitted Exhibit No. 1, which 
is a copy of your notes. Do you have that in front of you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And do you have the original, as well, in front of 
you? 
A. Yes. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Your Honor, I would like to walk 
through this with him --
THE COURT: Ask your questions. See if there's an 
objection. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: --if the Court is, ah, would 
indulge me. 
MZ. REYES: Your Honor, I would object that I think 
OFFICIAL CERTIFIED TRANSCRIPT 
PAGE 9 5 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
his hand 
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(Inaudible). Okay. 
Ah, Your Honor, you would h|ave -- prefer that he 
look at the one with the, ah, the exhlibit tag on it --
(Inaudible) -- courtesy copy? 
THE COURT; No. I'd prefer that he give his 
recollection about what happened. 
required 
over and 
Q. 
calls to 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
you, stat 
0. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Okay. 
THE COURT: I think that's khat a witness is 
to do. I think he probably lought to turn the paper 
see what his recollection is|. 
(BY MR. QUESENBERRY): Okay. Flip it over. 
Do you recall when you first began making phone 
Mr. Dorius's office. 
Yes . 
About when was that? 
Ah, April 20th, after I received a phone call from 
ing the bank had reconveyed 
Oh. Okav. Don't --
A. Okay. 
Q. I don't want to hear my conversation with you. 
Did you take notes of these phone calls? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That series of phone calls. 
Did you -- how did you take them? How did you 
specifically take these notes? 
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A. Ah, each and every time I called them I had a tablet 
with me and I wrote the time, the date, and basically what was 
discussed. 
Q. Within how -- (Inaudible) -- the period of time from 
when you hung up the phone to when you wrote these down? 
A. Within a minute, two minutes. Sometimes right as 
soon as I hung up. 
Q. So you began on - - on Friday the 20th. Was that Mr. 
Dorius or Mr. Bond? Do you recall who you called? 
A. I was trying to reach Mr. Dorius. 
Q. And were you successful reaching him, initially? 
A. On the first call, no. On the second call, what was 
on the 25th of April, ah, I spoke with Mr. Dorius. 
Q. Did you speak with him any other time, other than 
that April the 25th phone call? 
A. I think we spoke one more time, but it was way 
further down the line. 
Q. So the April 25th phone call you spoke with him. 
What do you recall by the conversation with him? 
A. Ah, I called him and told him that I needed the, ah, 
payoff for the judgment and liens that were on the property 
because I had the bank loan in place and I also had another 
source of money to pay him and, ah - -
Q. How did -- how did he respond to that? 
A. He asked me, as I recall, something, "What do you 
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1 II think would be fair on this?" And t offered - - I said, "Fair 
2 H to me, would be about 58,500. But } need the full payoff on 
your letterhead, signed by you, and sent to D-Land Title so 
that this bank loan can be closed." 
Everything was ready to gc( except for the -- for Mr. 
6 II Dorius or Mr. Bond. 
7 || 0. And how did he respond to that? 
A. Ah, said that he would get into the file and he 
9 H would get back to me later; that he Ihad to speak with, ah, Mr. 
10 II Bond and then he would get back to m|e. 
11 Q. When did you call his offife next? Do you recall? 
12 A. Ah, it started on the, ah, 25th and I called every 
13 day, except the weekends. So the 23£d, probably the 24th. 
14 Q. Well, so far you've talked about the 20th --
15 A. 20th. 
16 J Q. -- and then the 25th --
17 A. 25th. 
18 Q. — when you actually had tl}e conversation with him. 
19 So after the 25th? 
20 A. 1 called him on the 25th be|cause I got the 
21 reconveyance from the bank in my hand|. So then I -- that was 
22 cleared, so that's the - - when I spokie with him. 
23 Q. About how many times do you recall calling his 
24 office, after this -- this initial phpne call with him? 
25 A. Over 28 times. And I called their number in, ah, 
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maybe it's a different --
MR. QUESENBERRY: The conversation with him. 
THE COURT: You're asking him for a date. 
MR. QUESENBERRY: Correct. If he recalls when he 
first spoke with Mr. Bond. 
THE WITNESS: Ah, looks like the, ah, 10th of May. 
Q. (BY MR. QUESENBERRY): And what did you tell Mr. 
Bond? 
A. Ah, the discussion I had with, ah, Mr. Dorius, ah, 
that I needed the payoff; that I had the bank loan plus I had 
other sources of money to pay them off. And I also asked him 
who was in charge -- who I need to get this from who was in 
charge of this lien. 
It was in his name, but Mr. Dorius owned it or 
something because he worked for him. And Mr. Bond told me 
that Mr. Dorius was in charge of the --of the loan so. 
Q. Did he indicate what a payoff amount would be? 
Mr. 
to 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Bond 
me. 
Q. 
would ca 
A. 
No. 
How 
Just 
, and 
did you end the conversation with 
that they 
figure out 
Mr. Bond said he' 
Did 
11 you 
Yes. 
would get 
the payoff 
d call me 
Mr. Bond tell you, in 
back? 
together, Mr. 
, and 
back. 
that 
him? 
Dorius 
they would get 
and 
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conversation, he 
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1 Q. And during that time span and those phone calls to 
2 her, did she ever tell you, ah, that Mr. Dorius doesn't want 
3 to talk to you. 
4 A. No. 
5 Q. Did she ever tell you that they would not get you a 
6 payoff amount? 
7 A. No. 
8 Q. Did she ever tell you to stop calling? 
9 A. No. 
10 Q. Did Mr. Bond, at any time, tell you, "Stop calling 
11 me. " 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Did he, at any time, tell you, "I'm not giving you a 
14 payoff amount." 
15 A. No. 
16 Q. "Leave me alone." 
17 A. No. 
18 Q. How about Mr. Dorius? Did he, at.any time, tell 
19 you, "Leave me alone --" --
2 0 A. No. 
21 Q. -- or "Stop calling," or "^'m not gonna get you 
2 2 anything." 
23 A. No. 
24 Q. Now I think you testified 4^ o u t your conversations 
25 with Mr. Dorius. You've mentioned one, early on, April 20th. 
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1 Was there another conversation that you had with Mr. Dorius? 
2 A. Yes. I believe we had a second one, ah, two to 
3 three days after the first one. And he * said he was having 
4 trouble getting a hold of Mr. Bond and that he would do so and 
5 then get back with me. 
6 Q. Did he say what he'd get back with you about or what 
i information he'd get you? 
8 A. With the payoff that I'd been asking for. 
9 j Q. Did he give you any indication that he would not 
10 provide you the information you've requested? 
11 A. No. 
12 0. How about after that? 
13 A. That --
14 Q. Did he call you --or you talked with him at any 
15 | time after that second conversation? 
16 A. Just the two times that I recollect. The rest of 
17 'em is just trying to get a hold of him. 
18 Q. Did you expect, during this time of questions 
19 MZ. REYES: I'm gonna object as to leading. 
2 0 THE COURT: Well, what he expected doesn't make any 
21 difference either, so sustained. Go on to another question. 
22 0. (BY MR. GUESENBERRY): Did you ever get a -- get a 
23 payoff amount from either Mr. Bond or Mr. Dorius or someone 
24 from their office? 
2 5 THE WITNESS: No. 
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1 It's still a good argument. I don't mean to say 
2 your argument's not worthwhile, but, a(h, it doesn't change my 
3 mind about receiving the document. 
4 I Okay. Other questions? 
5 MR. QUESENBERRY: Go ahead. 
6 THE COURT: Cross examination, Mz. Reyes. 
7 CROSS EXAMINATION 
8 BY MZ. REYES: 
9 Q. Mr. Pyper, you indicate that|, ah, you had a bank 
10 loan in place. That -- that was your testimony; correct? 
11 That you had a bank loan in place. 
12 A. My son. 
13 Q. Okay. 
14 So you've never had a bank lloan in place. You've 
15 never had funds available or any proof}. Okay. Well, then let 
16 me just ask you this. This appraisal, this was done for Ryan 
17 T- Pyper. Who is Ryan T. Pyper? 
18 A. My son. 
19 Q. You testified earlier that |ou had a bank loan in 
20 place. You just needed a payoff. Th4t's not true; right? 
21 A. No. He had the bank loan iijL place. 
22 Q. He had the bank loan. Okayi 
23 A. I did all the paperwork and got everything for him 
24 and set it up. But it was in his nam^. He was buying the 
25 house. 
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1 II met. You called him EO make an offer of settlement. 
2 II A. No. I called him to get the payoff. During this 
3 || discussion he, ah, asked me what I thought was fair and I says 
$85 -- $8,500 would be more than fair to me, ah, for what was 
done. Then he said something like, "Well, you've really 
ruffled --" --
Q. Okay. You don't -- you don't need to -- you don't 
need to respond. I just need you to answer my questions, 
please. 
So isn't it true that you also indicated to Mr. 
Dorius that you would have to have the lien released off of 
the home in order for you to come up with the $8,500 that you 
were offering at that time? 
A. For the bank loan, ah, yes. I needed a written 
statement from him for the payment -- total payment, releasing 
everything, before the bank would give money. But I had 
another source of money, ah, cash. 
Q. So at that time you didn't actually have --at that 
time you didn't actually have the ability to pay $8,500 unless 
they were willing to release the lien; isn't that true? 
A. At that time I had the ability to pay the full 
amount, whatever that may have been. 
Q. Why did you make no effort to attempt to tender 
into -- I'm sorry -- to provide that money to Mr. Dorius' 
office? I 
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A. No one would ever cell me what I owed. 
Q. But you knew what you owed, You indicated that 
under the Writ of Execution you knew you owed him 
approximately -- your testimony was Approximately 13,000, but 
you made no efforts whatsoever to provide any moneys; isn't 
that true? 
A. No. Not until they would cjjive me, ah the payoff 
with interest or whatever else was gc^ nna be added on there so 
that the title would be clear. Whatever they would have told 
me, I had the money at that time to jj)ay them off. 
Q. Subject to them releasing tthe lien on the property. 
That's the only way you could get thg money. 
A. No. I had the cash to pay them the full amount of 
whatever they may have come up with t}p to $18,000. Ah, I had 
the cash at that time to pay them, --
Q 
A, 
Any 
but I needed the note frlom them to get my loan 
from the bank afterwards --
Q. At this time you knew that --
A. -- to release it. 
Q. - - your time to redeem the p roper ty was running; 
co r rec t? 
A. Yes. 
0. You knew about the sherifff£ sale that took place on 
November 9th. 
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Q. (BY MZ. REYES): Since the time of the sheriff's sale 
on November 9th of 2 00S, has someone been living in the home? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
Q. And who was that person? 
A. My son. 
Q. And is -- is he paying to reside in the home? 
A. He's done payment by, ah, we've put a new roof on, 
all new soffit and facial, redone bathrooms, ah, poured 
cement. 
Q. When were all these things done? 
A. Ah, from November -- well, over the last year and, 
ah, before the appraisal. 
Q. So this appraisal takes into account improvements on 
the property --
A. Yes. 
Q. -- that weren't there at the time of the sheriff's 
sale in November of '06. 
A. Right. 
Q. Okay. 
A. The appraiser came out and told us before he could , 
appraise it that he needed certain things done for the bank 
for him to appraise this property. So we done them things. 
Q. Was -- was the home, at that time when you said this 
appraiser contacted you, was that some time before November or 
in November? (No verbal response.) 
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